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PRISONER CONVICTED OF A CRIME COMMITTED WHEN HE WAS SIXTEEN AND SUBJECT TO A LIFE SENTENCE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO A PAROLE HEARING WHICH TAKES HIS YOUTH AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE INTO ACCOUNT.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCarthy, over a concurrence and a two-justice partial dissent, determined petitioner was entitled to a de novo parole hearing in which his age at the time of the offense (16) is taken into account. Claimant was convicted of strangling his 14-year-old girlfriend and was sentenced to 22 years to life. Since serving 22 years in 2000, claimant, now 54, has been denied parole nine times. The Third Department ruled that the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment required that the parole board consider petitioner's youth at the time of the offense, noting that claimant has a right not to be punished with a life sentence if the crime reflects transient immaturity:

The [Parole] Board, as the entity charged with determining whether petitioner will serve a life sentence, was required to consider the significance of petitioner's youth and its attendant circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime before making a parole determination. That consideration is the minimal procedural requirement necessary to ensure the substantive Eighth Amendment protections set forth in Graham v Florida (560 US 48 [2010]), Miller v Alabama (___ US ___, 132 S Ct 2455 [2012]) and Montgomery v Louisiana (___ US ___, 136 S Ct 718 [2016]). * * *

… [T]he Supreme Court of the United States held in Miller v Alabama (supra) that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment (id. at 2460). As that Court has since clarified, a substantive rule announced in Miller is “that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity” (Montgomery v Louisiana, 136 S Ct at 735). The Court considered this guarantee in the context of the sentencing stage, and it found that the “procedural requirement necessary to implement [this] substantive guarantee” is “a hearing where youth and its attendant characteristics are considered” for the purpose of “separat[ing] those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not” … . * * *

A parole board is no more entitled to subject an offender to the penalty of life in prison in contravention of this rule than is a legislature or a sentencing court. Matter of Hawkins v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2016 NY Slip Op 03236, 3rd Dept 4-28-16


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