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DEFENSE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, THE JURY FOUND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT AND THERE WAS NO REASONABLE VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE IN WHICH DEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

The Second Department determined plaintiffs' motion to set aside the defense verdict as against the weight of the evidence should have been granted. Defendant acknowledged she turned right coming out of a parking lot but was looking to her left. Defendant struck the pedestrian plaintiffs. The jury found defendant was negligent but that her negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. The court noted that the plaintiffs may also have been negligent, but there was no reasonable view of the evidence in which defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause:

… [T]he jury's determination that the defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident did not rest upon any fair interpretation of the evidence … . The issues of negligence and proximate cause are so inextricably interwoven in this case that the jury's finding that the defendant was negligent cannot be reconciled with its finding that the negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident … . That is, the defendant admitted that she turned right out of a parking lot while looking to her left despite the fact that she knew that pedestrians crossed 71st Avenue at that location to access the parking lot from which she was exiting. Notwithstanding any negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, the defendant's negligence in driving in one direction while looking in the other direction and thereby failing to see pedestrians who were there to be seen in the middle of the street was a substantial, not a slight or trivial, cause of this accident … . Accordingly, although the plaintiffs may also have been negligent, no fair interpretation of the evidence supports the jury's finding that the defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. Cruz v Jeffrey, 2016 NY Slip Op 03134, 2nd Dept 4-27-16


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