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RADIOLOGIST WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO EXPRESS AN OPINION ON THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEFORMITY WHICH WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE RESULTED FROM A FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE A FRACTURE. 

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants in a medical malpractice action were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them. The complaint alleged defendant radiologist failed to diagnose a fractured finger, which was the proximate cause of a deformity. In opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff offered an affidavit from a radiologist, Dr. Tantleff, who was qualified to evaluate the alleged failed diagnosis, but was not qualified to find the failed diagnosis was the proximate cause of the deformity (an orthopedic matter). Therefore the defendants were entitled to summary judgment:

Here, Dr. Tantleff's opinion as to proximate cause was related to the specialty of orthopedics, but Dr. Tantleff failed to state any basis on which he could be found competent to opine in that area. Therefore he was not qualified to render an opinion that Fong's failure to diagnose the plaintiff's nondisplaced fracture proximately caused the alleged orthopedic injuries … . Moreover, his assertion was speculative, as he cited to no record evidence to support his opinion that the plaintiff's alleged injuries were due to the undiagnosed fracture … . Martinez v Quintana, 2016 NY Slip Op 02782, 2nd Dept 4-13-16


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