You are here: / / RADIOLOGIST WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO EXPRESS AN OPINION ON THE PROXIMATE CAUSE...
, ,

RADIOLOGIST WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO EXPRESS AN OPINION ON THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEFORMITY WHICH WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE RESULTED FROM A FAILURE TO DIAGNOSE A FRACTURE. 

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants in a medical malpractice action were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them. The complaint alleged defendant radiologist failed to diagnose a fractured finger, which was the proximate cause of a deformity. In opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff offered an affidavit from a radiologist, Dr. Tantleff, who was qualified to evaluate the alleged failed diagnosis, but was not qualified to find the failed diagnosis was the proximate cause of the deformity (an orthopedic matter). Therefore the defendants were entitled to summary judgment:

Here, Dr. Tantleff's opinion as to proximate cause was related to the specialty of orthopedics, but Dr. Tantleff failed to state any basis on which he could be found competent to opine in that area. Therefore he was not qualified to render an opinion that Fong's failure to diagnose the plaintiff's nondisplaced fracture proximately caused the alleged orthopedic injuries … . Moreover, his assertion was speculative, as he cited to no record evidence to support his opinion that the plaintiff's alleged injuries were due to the undiagnosed fracture … . Martinez v Quintana, 2016 NY Slip Op 02782, 2nd Dept 4-13-16


You might also like
CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO A FINDING THAT REUNIFICATION WITH HIS MOTHER IN EL SALVADOR WAS NOT VIABLE DUE TO PARENTAL NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE BUSINESS RECORDS UPON WHICH THE REFEREE’S CALCULATIONS WERE BASED WERE NOT ATTACHED TO THE REFEREE’S AFFIDAVIT, RENDERING THE AFFIDAVIT HEARSAY (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HUMP OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED AND FELL WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, TOWN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS VOID PURSUANT TO REAL PROPERTY LAW 265-b; NOT CLEAR WHETHER DEFENDANT LAW FIRM WAS ACTING AS A CONSULTANT IN A MATTER CONCERNING A DISTRESSED HOME LOAN; IF SO, THE DEFENDANT CAN VOID THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE (SECOND DEPT).
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE MAILING REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
CONDEMNEE WAS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES (ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS) BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN THAT OFFERED BY THE VILLAGE AND THE AWARD BY THE COURT IN THIS EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING; THE STATUTORY INTEREST RATE OF 6%, NOT 9%, SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED (SECOND DEPT).
In a Sexual Abuse Proceeding—Effects of Victim’s Exercise of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Exclusion of Appellant During Testimony of Victim Explained
THE PAVING CONTRACTOR FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT LAUNCH AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM (A LIP OR HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL IN THE ROAD SURFACE) WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL; THEREFORE THE CONTRACTOR DID NOT NEGATE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ESPINAL EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT CONTRACTORS ARE GENERALLY NOT LIABLE TO THIRD PARTIES (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS RIDING HIS BICYCLE THE WRONG WAY ON A ONE-WAY STREET... THE CITY (NYC) HAD ENTERED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS...