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1899 DEED COVENANT TO PROVIDE FREE ELECTRIC POWER TO DEFENDANT’S PREMISES RAN WITH THE LAND; HOWEVER THE IMPLIED DURATIONAL LIMITS ON THE COVENANT HAVE BEEN SURPASSED RENDERING IT UNENFORCEABLE.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that a covenant in an 1899 deed to provide free power to the property now occupied by defendant Allied Healthcare Product (AHP) was no longer enforceable. The covenant was precipitated by the building of a hydroelectric dam which cut off the water supply upon which the mills on the property now owned by AHP relied. The Third Department determined the covenant met all the requirements for running with the land. But the court went on to find that implied durational limits on the covenant have been surpassed:

While the general requisites of an affirmative covenant running with the land have been met, that does not end the matter. “The affirmative covenant is disfavored in the law because of the fear that this type of obligation imposes an 'undue restriction on alienation or an onerous burden in perpetuity'” … . The power covenant has no express limitation on its duration, and “it may 'fall[] prey to the criticism that it creates a burden in perpetuity, and purports to bind all future owners, regardless of the use to which the land is put'” … . AHP rightly points out that the power covenant may be implicitly “conditioned upon the continued existence of” a hydroelectric facility capable of supplying the required power to ongoing manufacturing at the mills … . Suffice it to say, those conditions have only been intermittently met as historical matter and are not met now. The hydroelectric power facility was not in operation from 1994 to 2012 and, while AHP attempts to minimize the fact, there was not constant manufacturing activity at the mills over the course of the last century. The record further shows that the hydroelectric facility, for both technical and legal reasons, cannot supply consistent or usable electricity directly to the mills. To find that the power covenant remains enforceable under these circumstances would render it an “onerous burden in perpetuity” disfavored by the law, as it would reach beyond any implied durational requirements and overlook the very real changes in the hydroelectric facility and the manner for distributing electricity that defeat the original purpose of the power covenant … . This result cannot be countenanced and, as such, the power covenant is unenforceable. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Allied Healthcare Prods., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 02504, 3rd Dept 3-31-16

REAL PROPERTY (1899 DEED COVENANT TO PROVIDE FREE ELECTRIC POWER TO DEFENDANT'S PREMISES RAN WITH THE LAND; HOWEVER THE IMPLIED DURATIONAL LIMITS ON THE COVENANT HAVE BEEN SURPASSED RENDERING IT UNENFORCEABLE)/DEEDS (1899 DEED COVENANT TO PROVIDE FREE ELECTRIC POWER TO DEFENDANT'S PREMISES RAN WITH THE LAND; HOWEVER THE IMPLIED DURATIONAL LIMITS ON THE COVENANT HAVE BEEN SURPASSED RENDERING IT UNENFORCEABLE)/COVENANT RUNNING WITH THE LAND (1899 DEED COVENANT TO PROVIDE FREE ELECTRIC POWER TO DEFENDANT'S PREMISES RAN WITH THE LAND; HOWEVER THE IMPLIED DURATIONAL LIMITS ON THE COVENANT HAVE BEEN SURPASSED RENDERING IT UNENFORCEABLE)

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