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THE SOLE REMEDY WHEN A CONVICTION IS DEEMED AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, REDUCTION TO A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined: (1) the defendant's conviction for robbery second degree was against the weight of the evidence because the physical injury element was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt (the injury at issue was a small cut on the victim's finger); and (2) when a conviction is deemed against the weight of the evidence, the only remedy is dismissal of the indictment and not a reduction to a conviction of a lesser included offense. The dissent saw no reason reduction to a conviction of a lesser included offense should not be available as a remedy:

“CPL 470.20 (5) provides that the determination by an intermediate appellate court that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence requires dismissal of the indictment . . . [T]he power to reduce a conviction to a lesser included offense is limited to cases in which it is determined that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of an offense of which he [or she] was convicted but is legally sufficient to establish his [or her] guilt of a lesser included offense' (CPL 470.15 [2] [a]).” Thus, we conclude that “CPL 420.20 (5) requires dismissal of the indictment if it is determined that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence” (id. at 31). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has explained that “[a]n important judicial bulwark against an improper criminal conviction is not only the restrictive scope of review undertaken during a sufficiency analysis, but the protection provided by weight of the evidence examination in an intermediate appellate court. This special power requires the court to . . . determine whether the verdict was factually correct[,] and acquit a defendant if the court is not convinced that the jury was justified in finding that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt” … . As we explained in Heatley (116 AD3d at 30), “if the legislature had intended to provide the same relief to modify a judgment in the event that the weight of the evidence failed to support the conviction but supported a lesser included offense, it would have done so.” People v Cooney, 2016 NY Slip Op 02203, 4th Dept 3-25-16

CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, THE SOLE REMEDY WHEN A CONVICTION IS DEEMED AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, REDUCTION TO A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE)/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, THE SOLE REMEDY WHEN A CONVICTION IS DEEMED AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, REDUCTION TO A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE)/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW (CRIMINAL LAW, THE SOLE REMEDY WHEN A CONVICTION IS DEEMED AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, REDUCTION TO A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE)

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