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DEFENDANT’S STARING AT THE POLICE FROM ACROSS THE ROAD DID NOT JUSTIFY THE INITIAL APPROACH BY THE POLICE, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND INDICTMENT FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Fourth Department determined defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted and the indictment must be dismissed. The police approached the defendant and others in a patrol car merely because they had observed the defendant staring at the police from the other side of the road. The police pulled along side defendant and asked “what's up guys?” Defendant walked away and discarded a weapon. The Fourth Department found that the initial approach by the police was not warranted:

We conclude that merely staring at or otherwise looking in the direction of police officers or a patrol vehicle in a high crime area while continuing to proceed on one's way, absent any indicia of nervousness, evasive behavior, or other movements in response to seeing the police, i.e., “attendant circumstances . . . sufficient to arouse the officers' interest” … , is insufficient to provide the police with the requisite “objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality” to justify a level one encounter … . Here, beyond the fact that defendant had stared at the police in a “higher crime area” while continuing to walk down the sidewalk, the officers testified to no further observations of defendant or the other men that drew their attention … and, to the extent that the court found that defendant displayed any nervous or evasive behavior upon initially seeing the officers, we conclude that such a finding is unsupported by the record. We agree with defendant that the officers lacked other attendant circumstances to arouse their interest inasmuch as the encounter occurred at 6:30 in the evening rather than late at night and there was automobile traffic in the area at that time … . People v Savage, 2016 NY Slip Op 02184, 4th Dept 3-25-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT'S STARING AT THE POLICE FROM ACROSS THE ROAD DID NOT JUSTIFY THE INITIAL APPROACH BY THE POLICE, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND INDICTMENT FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/SUPPRESSION (DEFENDANT'S STARING AT THE POLICE FROM ACROSS THE ROAD DID NOT JUSTIFY THE INITIAL APPROACH BY THE POLICE, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND INDICTMENT FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT'S STARING AT THE POLICE FROM ACROSS THE ROAD DID NOT JUSTIFY THE INITIAL APPROACH BY THE POLICE, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND INDICTMENT FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/STREET STOPS (DEFENDANT'S STARING AT THE POLICE FROM ACROSS THE ROAD DID NOT JUSTIFY THE INITIAL APPROACH BY THE POLICE, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND INDICTMENT FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

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