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UNDER THE FACTS, PRE-TRIAL REQUEST TO PROCEED PRO SE PROPERLY DENIED.

The First Department determined defendant's pre-trial request to represent himself was properly denied because the request raised a significant potential for obstruction and diversion. The request was made after the People rested in a suppression hearing:

… [T]he court properly denied defendant's request to represent himself. Although a request to proceed pro se at trial is generally deemed timely if asserted before trial (see People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10, 17 [1974]), defendant here waited until after the People had rested in the suppression hearing before requesting to proceed pro se within that hearing, raising a significant “potential for obstruction and diversion” (id.). Accordingly, the court properly denied defendant's request in the absence of “compelling circumstances” (id.). We note that, over the course of the proceedings, defendant was represented by a total of seven retained or assigned attorneys, and repeatedly changed his mind about whether to represent himself. People v Franklin, 2016 NY Slip Op 01781, 1st Dept 3-15-16

CRIMINAL LAW (PRE-TRIAL REQUEST TO PROCEED PRO SE PROPERLY DENIED)/PRO SE (CRIMINAL LAW, PRE-TRIAL REQUEST TO PROCEED PRO SE PROPERLY DENIED)

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