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REQUEST FOR THE NAME OF THE MOHEL WHO PERFORMED CIRCUMCISION ON AN INFANT WHO BECAME INFECTED WITH HERPES SIMPLEX VIRUS PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined a reporter’s (Berger’s) request to the NYC Department of Health for the name of a mohel who performed a circumcision on an infant who became infected with herpes simplex virus (HSV-1) was properly denied. A person’s medical history is exempt from disclosure under the Public Officers Law. Revealing the mohel’s name would reveal his medical condition:

As relevant here, Public Officers Law § 87(2)(b) expressly exempts from disclosure records that “if disclosed would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” under Public Officers Law § 89(2). Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b)(i) expressly includes “medical . . . histories” within the ambit of “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” … . In turn, the Court of Appeals has held that “medical history” is ” information that one would reasonably expect to be included as a relevant and material part of a proper medical history'” … .

Here, inherent in Berger’s request for “the name of the mohel who infected an infant with HSV-1 during ritual circumcision in December 2012” is that the mohel is himself infected with, or a carrier of, the HSV-1 virus. Thus, the petitioners’ argument that they are not requesting the mohel’s “medical history,” but only his name, is without merit. Inasmuch as that information is undeniably ” information that one would reasonably expect to be included as a relevant and material part of [the mohel’s] proper medical history'” … , it is “medical history” within the meaning of Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b)(i). The conclusion is thus inescapable that disclosure of the record Berger sought would be an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” under Public Officers Law § 89(2)(b)(i) and Public Officers Law § 87(2)(b). Matter of Berger v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 2016 NY Slip Op 01667, 2nd Dept 3-9-16

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (REQUEST FOR NAME OF MOHEL WHO INFECTED INFANT WITH HERPES SIMPLEX VIRUS PROPERLY DENIED)/PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW (FOIL, REQUEST FOR NAME OF MOHEL WHO INFECTED INFANT WITH HERPES SIMPLEX VIRUS PROPERLY DENIED)

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