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LANDSCAPER AND ITS INSURER STRICTLY LIABLE FOR OIL DISCHARGE ON PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY; OIL LINE SEVERED DURING SPRINKLER REPAIR.

The Second Department determined summary judgment was properly awarded to plaintiffs in an action under the Navigation Law based upon an oil spill. The defendant landscaping company acknowledged that its employee severed the underground oil line on plaintiffs’ property while repairing a sprinkler system. Navigation Law 181 (1) imposes strict liability upon a person responsible for the discharge of petroleum and any insurer:

Navigation Law § 181(1) provides that a person who has “discharged petroleum shall be strictly liable . . . for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained.” Article 12 of the Navigation Law defines a “discharge,” as relevant here, as “any intentional or unintentional action or omission resulting in the releasing, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping of petroleum” (Navigation Law § 172[8]). The statute provides that any individual or entity “who is not responsible for the discharge” may maintain a claim thereunder (Navigation Law § 172[3]…). The statute also provides that under article 12, “[a]ny claims for costs of cleanup and removal, civil penalties or damages by the state and any claim for damages by any injured person, may be brought directly against the bond, the insurer, or any other person providing evidence of financial responsibility” (Navigation Law § 190). Bennett v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 01452, 2nd Dept 3-2-16

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (LANDSCAPER STRICTLY LIABLE OF OIL DISCHARGE)/NAVIGATION LAW (LANDSCAPER STRICTLY LIABLE FOR OIL DISCHARGE)/INSURANCE LAW (INSURER STRICTLY LIABLE FOR OIL DISCHARGE BY INSURED)

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