You are here: / / DELEGATION CLAUSES, PLACING THE DETERMINATION OF ARBITRABILITY IN THE ARBITRATOR,...
,

DELEGATION CLAUSES, PLACING THE DETERMINATION OF ARBITRABILITY IN THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT, ENFORCEABLE UNDER FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, reversing the Appellate Division, determined “delegation clauses” in insurance-related contracts were enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The “delegation clauses” required that the initial determination whether a dispute is arbitrable is to be made by the arbitrator, not the court. Before reaching the merits, and after explaining the history of the FAA and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Court of Appeals decided, under the facts, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not remove the matter from the jurisdiction of the FAA:

 

… [A] review of the record reveals that [the insureds] did not specifically direct any challenge to the delegation clauses empowering the arbitrators to determine gateway questions of arbitrability … . Those delegation provisions, which state that the arbitrators “have exclusive jurisdiction over the entire matter in dispute, including any question as to its arbitrability,” are valid because the parties “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to arbitrate arbitrability … . As the delegation clauses are severable from the remainder of the agreements to arbitrate, we must enforce them according to their terms and, under these circumstances, the question of arbitrability is one for the arbitrators … . …

… [W]e hold that the FAA applies to the [contracts in issue] because it does not “invalidate, impair, or supersede” … any insurance regulations and, consequently, the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not triggered … . Further, because the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of arbitrability and enforceability of the arbitration clauses to the arbitrators — in provisions that were not specifically challenged by the insureds — the FAA mandates that the arbitration provisions be enforced as written. Matter of Monarch Consulting, Inc. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2016 NY Slip Op 01209, CtApp 2-18-16

 

ARBITRATION (DELEGATION CLAUSES IN INSURANCE-RELATED AGREEMENTS, PLACING THE DECISION WHETHER A MATTER IS ARBITRABLE IN THE ARBITRATOR, ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT)/FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (DELEGATION CLAUSES IN INSURANCE-RELATED AGREEMENTS, PLACING THE DECISION WHETHER A MATTER IS ARBITRABLE IN THE HANDS OF THE ARBITRATOR, ENFORCEABLE)/INSURANCE LAW (DELEGATION CLAUSES IN INSURANCE-RELATED AGREEMENTS, PLACING THE DECISION WHETHER A MATTER IS ARBITRABLE IN THE HANDS OF THE ARBITRATOR, ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT)

You might also like
DEFENDANT’S COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL WERE NOT SPECIFIC OR SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT AN INQUIRY BY THE JUDGE; THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).
ONCE THE APPELLATE DIVISION DETERMINED A SORA RISK FACTOR DID NOT APPLY, BRINGING DEFENDANT’S RISK ASSESSMENT FROM A LEVEL THREE TO A LEVEL TWO, THE APPELLATE COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO REMIT THE MATTER TO COUNTY COURT TO CONSIDER, FOR THE FIRST TIME, WHETHER AN UPWARD DEPARTURE WAS WARRANTED (CT APP).
Fact that Property Has a Use “Auxiliary or Incidental to the Main Exempt Purpose” Does Not Defeat the Real Property Tax Exemption Under RPTL 420-a
HERE DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS REDUCED PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) AFTER SHE HAD BEEN IMPRISONED LONGER THAN THE MAXIMUM ALLOWED BY THE DVSJA; THE EXCESS PRISON TIME SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CREDITED TO ELIMINATE THE PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION (CT APP).
DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT INEFFECTIVE; EVIDENCE OF CHILD’S MULTIPLE DISCLOSURES OF SEX ABUSE WAS NOT BOLSTERING; DEFENSE COUNSEL ARTICULATED LEGITIMATE REASONS FOR NOT CALLING A MEDICAL EXPERT.
Physician Can Be Removed from Medicaid Program Irrespective of Action Taken by Bureau of Professional Medical Conduct
MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL.
PETITIONER NOT ENTITLED TO COUNSEL IN A STATEWIDE CENTRAL REGISTER OF CHILD ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT (SCR) PROCEEDING; THE STATUTE REQURING EXPUNGEMENT OF AN SCR CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORT IF THE RELATED FAMILY COURT CASE IS DISMISSED DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY; THE MALTREATMENT REPORT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE (CT APP).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FITNESS INSTRUCTOR NOT AN EMPLOYEE. MECHANISMS FOR SEEKING DEFERRAL OF MANDATORY SURCHARGE EXPLAINED.