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FAILURE TO NAME INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS, OR JOHN DOE OFFICERS, IN A NOTICE OF CLAIM PRECLUDED SUIT AGAINST THE POLICE OFFICERS SUBSEQUENTLY NAMED IN THE COMPLAINTS.

The First Department affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of an action against the police department and several named individual police officers because the notice of claim named only the New York City Police Department as a defendant and did not name any individual officers or any “john doe” officers. Justice Sweeney explained his reasoning for affirming in a concurring memorandum. Two justices dissented in a memorandum by Justice Manzanet-Daniels. Justice Sweeney argued that the underlying purpose of a notice of claim is to allow the municipality to make a timely investigation into the allegations. By failing to name individual officers, the municipality was not given sufficient notice. The dissent argued that the General Municipal Law does not require the naming (in a notice of claim) of individual employees of a municipality to state a valid claim against employees of a municipality:

Plaintiffs here did not put the City on notice that it would seek to impose liability upon specific employees of the NYPD. Indeed, as the action progressed, more and more police officers were added as individual defendants, the last of which over three years removed from the incident in question, thus rendering a timely investigation into and assessment of the claims impossible. To permit such a result raises questions of fundamental fairness for the individual defendants, since they were not put on notice, even in a generic way by way of “Police Officer John Doe” or similar language, that they were going to become defendants. Moreover, the prejudice accruing to both the municipal and individual defendants from such a delay is obvious, since memories fade over time, records that could have easily been obtained early on may have been archived, lost or discarded, and witnesses may have relocated, just to name a few of the potential obstacles. Delay in investigating and evaluating a claim defeats the purpose of GML § 50-e. Alvarez v City of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 09601, 1st Dept 12-29-15

MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, FAILURE TO NAME POLICE OFFICERS OR JOHN DOE OFFICERS PRECLUDED SUIT AGAINST OFFICERS SUBSEQUENTLY NAMED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (FAILURE TO NAME POLICE OFFICERS OR JOHN DOE OFFICERS PRECLUDED SUIT AGAINST OFFICERS SUBSEQUENTLY NAMED)/POLICE OFFICERS (NOTICE OF CLAIM, FAILURE TO NAME POLICE OFFICERS OR JOHN DOE OFFICERS PRECLUDED SUIT AGAINST OFFICERS SUBSEQUENTLY NAMED)

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