You are here: / / AGREEMENT ALLOWING CASINO GAMBLING ON ONEIDA NATION LAND DID NOT VIOLATE...

AGREEMENT ALLOWING CASINO GAMBLING ON ONEIDA NATION LAND DID NOT VIOLATE TOWNS’ “HOME RULE” RIGHTS.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined the petitioners, the Town of Vernon and the Town of Verona, did not have standing to attack an agreement (ratified by the New York Gaming Economic Development Act of 2013 [UNYGEDA]) allowing the Oneida Nation to implement legalized casino gambling. The towns argued that the agreement violated the towns’ “home rule” rights by removing land from their zoning and environmental authority, as well as preventing the collection of property taxes. The Third Department held that it was the placing of Oneida Nation land in trust (by the federal Department of the Interior) which caused these negative consequences and the trust was created before the agreement at issue:

These negative consequences … did not result from the agreement or from the UNYGEDA, but, instead, from the decision by the Department to place the lands in trust. That decision had already been made when the agreement was executed, and it was unaffected by any State action other than the agreement’s provision that the State and the Counties would discontinue then-pending federal litigation that challenged the Department’s decision. In 2014, the State and Counties did so … . The State has no constitutional obligation to pursue litigation, nor have petitioners established that the litigation would have resulted in the reversal of the Department’s decision to place the lands in trust if it had not been settled. Further, the discontinuance of the State’s claims did not foreclose the Towns from pursuing separate federal litigation that challenged the Department’s action, which they did until the action was dismissed on the merits in 2015 … . Thus, the State’s actions did not cause the harm that forms the basis of the Towns’ claims. Accordingly, the Towns failed to establish that the agreement and the UNYGEDA impinged upon their home rule powers, and Supreme Court properly ruled that they lacked the capacity to bring this action/proceeding. Matter of Town of Verona v Cuomo, 2015 NY Slip Op 09338, 3rd Dept 12-17-15

MONTHLY COMPILATION INDEX ENTRIES:

MUNCIPAL LAW (AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING CASINO GAMBLING ON ONEIDA NATION LAND DID NOT VIOLATE TOWNS’ HOME RULE RIGHTS)/HOME RULE (AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING CASINO GAMBLING ON ONEIDA NATION LAND DID NOT VIOLATE TOWNS’ HOME RULE RIGHTS)/GAMBLING (AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING CASINO GAMBLING ON ONEIDA NATION LAND DID NOT VIOLATE TOWNS’ HOME RULE RIGHTS)/ONEIDA NATION (AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING CASINO GAMBLING ON ONEIDA NATION LAND DID NOT VIOLATE TOWNS’ HOME RULE RIGHTS)

You might also like
SUPERMARKET EMPLOYEES HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO AID AN UNCONSCIOUS PERSON IN A CAR IN THE SUPERMARKET PARKING LOT.
FATHER PROPERLY FOUND TO HAVE SEVERELY ABUSED ALL THE CHILDREN IN THE HOME; DESPITE THE WORDING OF THE SEVERE ABUSE STATUTE, WHICH USES THE TERM “PARENT,” THE COVERAGE OF THE STATUTE IS NOT LIMITED TO BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN (THIRD DEPT).
Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel Precluded Plaintiff from Taking a Position Contrary to the Position Plaintiff Took In Two Prior Successful Actions
PLAINTIFF’S WORKPLACE GENDER-DISCRIMINATION CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).
​ THE MAJORITY HELD THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH DISORDERLY CONDUCT AS A FAMILY OFFENSE, FINDING THE CONDUCT WAS NOT “PUBLIC;” THE DISSENT ARGUED THE CONDUCT WAS “PUBLIC” IN THAT IT TOOK PLACE IN THE PRESENCE OF ADULTS AND CHILDREN OUTSIDE A DAYCARE CENTER (THIRD DEPT).
IN THIS WILL CONSTRUCTION PROCEEDING, ALTHOUGH THE WILL DID NOT ANTICIPATE DECEDENT’S HUSBAND WOULD DIE BEFORE HER, THE DECEDENT’S INTENT WAS CLEAR AND WAS PROPERLY ENFORCED BY SURROGATE’S COURT.
IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE REFEREE’S FAILURE TO HOLD A HEARING DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE IF THE DEFENDANT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE THE REFEREE’S REPORT BY SUBMITTING EVIDENCE DIRECTLY TO SUPREME COURT (THIRD DEPT).
THE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT INTENDED TO PURCHASE DEALER QUANTITIES OF COCAINE FROM A DEALER (SANCHEZ) AND COOKED CRACK COCAINE FOR THAT DEALER WAS NOT LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF AN INTENT TO ORGANIZE OR LEAD THE DEALER’S DISTRIBUTION NETWORK; CONSPIRACY CONVICTON REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTION NOT REQUIRED TO DISCLOSE (1) FACEBOOK PHOTOGRAPHS... SUPERMARKET EMPLOYEES HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO AID AN UNCONSCIOUS PERSON IN A CAR...