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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER CITY LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL A STOP SIGN AT AN ACCIDENT-PRONE INTERSECTION.

The Second Department determined there was a question of fact whether the municipality should have installed an all-way stop at an intersection where plaintiff was injured. A study of the intersection by the municipality, prompted by the number of accidents, was deemed inadequate:

A municipality owes a nondelegable duty to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition … . However, it is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway safety planning decision … . A municipality may be held liable only “when its study of a traffic condition is plainly inadequate or there is no reasonable basis for its traffic plan” … . * * *

“Once [a municipality] is made aware of a dangerous traffic condition it must undertake reasonable study thereof with an eye toward alleviating the danger” … . “Moreover, after the [municipality] implements a traffic plan it is under a continuing duty to review its plan in the light of its actual operation'” … . Under these circumstances, the City’s submissions revealed triable issues of fact regarding the adequacy of the … 2008 re-evaluation of its prior study which it undertook to complete, and the reasonableness of the City’s failure to install a stop sign … at the intersection under all of the attendant circumstances … . Langer v Xenias, 2015 NY Slip Op 09258. 2nd Dept 12-16-15

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LIABILITY, FAILURE INSTALL STOP SIGN)/MUNICIPAL LAW (LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL STOP SIGN)/TRAFFIC PLAN (MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO INSTALL STOP SIGN)

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FAILURE TO INSTRUCT JURY ON EFFECT OF STATUTORY AND REGULATORY VIOLATIONS REQUIRED... NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITY AND PLAINTIFF; CITY WAS THEREFORE IMMUNE...