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PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW EXPLAINED; PLAINTIFF’S ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, determined plaintiff, who had brought a racial-discrimination action under the New York City Human Rights Law,  was unable to show that the employer’s reasons for terminating her were pretextual. The court held that the phrase “a leopard does not change its spots” and the term “tirade,” used in reference to plaintiff’s behavior, did not have discriminatory meanings. With respect to the proof requirements under the NYC Human Rights Law (“City HRL”), the court explained:

How the City HRL’s distinctive substantive definitions, standards, and frameworks interact with existing standards for summary judgment has been the subject of some confusion … . As with any other civil case, a discrimination plaintiff must produce enough evidence to preclude the moving defendant from being able to prove that (1) no issues of material fact have been placed in dispute by competent evidence, and (2) a reasonable jury (resolving all inferences that can reasonably be drawn in favor of the non-moving party) could not find for the plaintiff on any set of facts under any theory of the case. But recognizing that the general evidentiary standard remains the same in discrimination cases does not permit a court to apply the standard in a manner that ignores the distinctiveness of City HRL causes of action. All the general standard does, in other words, is provide the template that says, “Defendant must prove that no reasonable jury can conclude X.” The “X” depends on the cause of action.

Thus, the only substantive requirement in a City HRL case where the plaintiff goes the “pretext” route is for the plaintiff to produce some evidence to suggest that at least one reason is “false, misleading, or incomplete.” A plaintiff who satisfies this requirement may well have produced less evidence than would be required under the state and federal laws. But he or she will have produced enough evidence to preclude the defendant from proving that no reasonable jury could conclude that any of the defendant’s reasons was pretextual. In other words, the general evidentiary standard comfortably co-exists with the distinctive substantive framework that must be applied to City HRL claims. Cadet-Legros v New York Univ. Hosp. Ctr., 2015 NY Slip Op 08984, 1st Dept 12-6-15

MONTHLY COMPILATION INDEX ENTRIES FOR THIS CASE:

EMPLOYMENT LAW (NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACTION DISMISSED)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, NEW YORK CITY (PROOF REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED)/DISCRIMINATION (NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ACTION DISMISSED)/ MUNICIPAL LAW (DISCRIMINATION ACTION UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW)

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