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New Relicensing Regulations Can Be Applied Retroactively (Re: Alcohol-Related Driving Convictions)

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles had the power to retroactively apply regulations re: the relicensing of persons with three or more alcohol-related driving convictions:

… [T]here is no merit to petitioner’s contention that the Commissioner erred in retroactively applying the amended regulations to his application … . “[P]etitioner’s driver’s license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions and revocation by [the Commissioner] under her discretionary powers . . . Thus, [the Commissioner] remained free to apply her most recent regulations when exercising her discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny petitioner’s application for relicensing. This is especially so in light of the rational, seven-month moratorium placed on all similarly-situated applicants for relicensing— i.e., persons with three or more alcohol-related driving convictions” … . Matter of Underwood v Fiala, 2015 NY Slip Op 08545, 4th Dept 11-20-15

 

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