You are here: / / Where Defendant Was Released on a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Relevant Period...

Where Defendant Was Released on a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Relevant Period of Incarceration Can Not Be Excluded from the Ten-Year Second Violent Felony Offender Calculation; Without That Exclusion, Defendant Could Not Be Sentenced as a Second Felon

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined (1) Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 120.90, requiring a quick arraignment after arrest, only applies where the defendant is arrested by police officers (here corrections officers told defendant of his arrest); (2) CPL 190.50, requiring notice of a grand jury presentation, does not apply where defendant has not been arraigned in a local court; and (3) the 442 days defendant was incarcerated for a parole violation could not be excluded from the ten-year “second violent felony offender” calculation because he was released from that incarceration on a writ of habeas corpus. Without that 442-day exclusion, defendant’s prior conviction was older than ten years and he could not be sentenced as a second felon:

A defendant who stands convicted of a violent felony may be adjudicated a second violent felony offender if he was previously convicted of a violent felony within ten years of the current offense (see Penal Law § 70.04[1][b][iv]). “[A]ny period of time during which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony” is excluded from the ten-year calculation (Penal Law § 70.04[1][b][v]). * * *

Although the habeas court did not vacate defendant’s conviction for a parole violation, it did grant his immediate release from confinement after determining that “the evidence did not support” defendant’s incarceration. A person “illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty . . . may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such detention and for deliverance” (CPLR 7002[a]). If a judge considering the habeas petition determines that a person has been unlawfully detained, he “shall . . . issue a writ of habeas corpus for the relief of that person” (id.). That the habeas court in this case granted defendant’s immediate release based on a lack of evidence indicates that defendant was “imprisoned without reason” from 1992-1993. People v Small, 2015 NY Slip Op 08457, CtApp 11-19-15

 

You might also like
PROSECUTOR’S CHARACTERIZATION OF DNA EVIDENCE WAS NOT IMPROPER, DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE CHARACTERIZATION WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.
Assault and Robbery Committed by Separate Acts Involving the Same Victim–Consecutive Sentences Justified
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT LIMITED THE RIGHT TO DEMAND ARBITRATION TO THE UNION, NOT THE FIRED EMPLOYEE (CT APP).
Failure to Read Jury Notes to Counsel Before Calling in the Jury Was Not a Mode of Proceedings Error—The Error, Therefore, Must Be Preserved by Objection
Apartment Buildings Used to House Actors and Staff of a Youth and Summer Theater Entitled to Exemption from Real Property Tax Under Real Property Tax Law (RPTL 420-a)—Property Used to Further “Educational, Moral and Mental Improvement”
Notifying One’s Broker of an Accident Does Not Constitute Notification of the Insurer
THE COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD THE VIABILITY OF THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DOCTRINE AS IT APPLIES TO SCHOOL SPORTS; AN EXTENSIVE DISSENT ARGUED THE DOCTRINE SHOULD BE ABANDONED (CT APP).
Failure of Sentencing Court to Inform Defendant of Period of Post-Release Supervision Required Release after Sentence Served

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Enhanced Sentencing for Second Child Sexual Assault Felony Offenders Is Required... Presumption of Vindictive Sentencing Did Not Apply Here Where Defendant Rejected...