You are here: / / Police Did Not Have Sufficient Information to Justify Pursuit of Defendant;...

Police Did Not Have Sufficient Information to Justify Pursuit of Defendant; Street Stop (DeBour) Criteria Clearly Explained

The Second Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress the weapon he discarded during a police pursuit should have been granted. The police approached defendant after seeing him make several adjustments to his waistband. When defendant ran, the police pursued him. Because the police, based on their observations, could make only a level one inquiry (which the defendant had a right to ignore), the pursuit was not justified. The court offered a clear explanation of the criteria for street stops (DeBour criteria):

“On a motion to suppress physical evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance” … , the Court of Appeals established a graduated four-level test for evaluating the propriety of police encounters when a police officer is acting in a law enforcement capacity … . The first level permits a police officer to request information from an individual, and merely requires that the request be supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality … . The second level, known as the common-law right of inquiry, requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and permits a somewhat greater intrusion … . The third level permits a police officer to forcibly stop and detain an individual. Such a detention, however, is not permitted unless there is a reasonable suspicion that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime … . The fourth level authorizes an arrest based on probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime … .

In order to justify police pursuit, the officers must have “reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed” … . Reasonable suspicion has been defined as “that quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand” … . A suspect’s “[f]light alone . . . even [his or her flight] in conjunction with equivocal circumstances that might justify a police request for information, is insufficient to justify pursuit” … . However, flight, “combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, could provide the predicate necessary to justify pursuit” … . People v Clermont, 2015 NY Slip Op 07989, 2nd Dept 11-4-15

 

You might also like
Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Applied In Civil Suit Alleging Sexual Abuse Where Defendant Pled Guilty to Offenses Described in the Civil Suit
IN THIS SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST THE PORT AUTHORITY, THE APPLICABLE STATUTE PROVIDES THAT THE NOTICE OF CLAIM MUST BE SERVED AT LEAST 60 DAYS BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION (NOT 60 DAYS AFTER THE ACCRUAL OF THE ACTION); THEREFORE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS TIMELY SERVED (SECOND DEPT). ​
INFECTING A VICTIM WITH HIV CONSTITUTES “PHYSICAL INJURY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF RISK FACTOR 1 RE: THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT; HOWEVER THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT IN FACT INFECTED THE VICTIM WITH HIV WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE DAMAGES WERE INCURRED (SECOND DEPT).
THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED A PARTIAL VERDICT WITHOUT INTERVIEWING THE JUROR WHO HAD INFORMED THE COURT SHE COULD NOT CONTINUE DELIBERATING BECAUSE SHE WAS SUFFERING ANXIETY ATTACKS; BECAUSE THE JUROR WAS NOT QUESTIONED, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WHETHER THE PARTIAL VERDICT WAS REACHED BEFORE THE JUROR BECAME UNABLE TO CONTINUE (SECOND DEPT).
FILING A 90 DAY NOTICE AND THEN DISCONTINUING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IN 2014 DID NOT REVOKE THE ELECTION TO ACCELERATE REPRESENTED BY THE FILING OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN 2008, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY (SECOND DEPT).
THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO IDENTIFY “JOHN DOE” “JANE DOE” DEFENDANTS AS POLICE OFFICERS IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED AND THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF STUDENT INJURED WHEN GYMNASIUM DOOR CLOSED ON HIS FINGER, INADEQUATE SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY, CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR TORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NOTICE OF CLAIM DID NOT INCLUDE ALLEGATION THAT THE DOOR WAS DEFECTIVE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Defense Request to Review Psychiatric Records of Prosecution Witness Properly... Need for Appointment of a Guardian of Property Not Demonstrated, Criteria E...