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Need for Appointment of a Guardian of Property Not Demonstrated, Criteria Explained

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the appellant’s sister, Marie F., did not meet her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence appellant was incapacitated. The sister had been appellant’s property guardian and, in being removed, requested that another guardian be appointed. The court explained the relevant criteria:

“Mental Hygiene Law article 81 confers upon the court the discretion to determine whether a guardian should be appointed for an alleged incapacitated person” … . “In exercising its discretion to appoint a guardian for an individual’s property . . . , a court must make a two-pronged determination: first, that the appointment is necessary to manage the property or financial affairs of that person, and, second, that the individual either agrees to the appointment or that the individual is incapacitated’ as defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 81.02(b)” … . A person is incapacitated when the person is likely to suffer harm because: (1) the person is unable to provide for property management, and (2) the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability (see Mental Hygiene Law § 81.02[b]). A determination that a person is incapacitated under the provisions of Mental Hygiene Law article 81 “must be based on clear and convincing evidence” (Mental Hygiene Law § 81.12[a]). When a party seeks to terminate a guardianship, “the burden of proof shall be on the person objecting to such relief” (Mental Hygiene Law § 81.36[d]).

Here, although Marie F. wished to be removed as guardian, she was the only person who objected to the termination of the guardianship position and asked the Supreme Court to appoint a new guardian. However, Marie F. failed to meet her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the appellant was incapacitated. The hearing testimony demonstrated that the appellant managed her own checking account, paid bills relating to her apartment with her social security disability income, and was taking steps to challenge the Medicaid lien. While the appellant was currently unemployed, she holds a Master’s degree and testified that she was “interviewing consistently.” Although Marie F. testified that the appellant had delusions and difficulty maintaining employment, her testimony was vague, unsupported by additional evidence, and did not rise to the level of clearly and convincingly demonstrating the appellant’s inability to provide for property management and a lack of understanding about the nature and consequences of such inability. Similarly, although Marie F. testified as to the appellant’s spending habits, she failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the appellant’s expenditures over the years were wasteful and thereby indicative of an inability on the part of the appellant to provide for her own property management and understand her budgetary constraints.

Since the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that the appellant was unable to manage her finances or understand and appreciate her limitations, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the appellant was incapacitated, appointing a new guardian of her property, and denying her motion to terminate the guardianship. Matter of Deborah P. (Marie F.), 2015 NY Slip Op 07977, 2nd Dept 11-4-15

 

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