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Criteria for “Interest of Justice” Extension of Time to Effect Service Explained

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court properly allowed plaintiff an extension of time to effect service on defendant in the interest of justice.  An “interest of justice” analysis in this context does not require a showing of good cause for the extension:

Pursuant to CPLR 306-b, if service is not timely made, “the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service.” Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff failed to establish good cause for an extension, we conclude that the court properly granted plaintiff’s cross motion in the interest of justice. That standard “requires a careful judicial analysis of the factual setting of the case and a balancing of the competing interests presented by the parties. Unlike an extension request premised on good cause, a plaintiff need not establish reasonably diligent efforts at service as a threshold matter. However, the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the [s]tatute of [l]imitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant” … .  Swaggard v Dagonese, 2015 NY Slip Op 07398, 4th Dept 10-9-15

 

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