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Family Court Has the Statutory Authority to Impose a Jail Term for Willful Violation of a Child Support Obligations

Reversing the support magistrate, the Second Department determined Family Court does have the authority to impose a jail term for willful violation of child support obligations:

The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and cannot exercise powers beyond those which are granted to it by statute … . However, Family Court Act § 451(1) specifically provides the Family Court with continuing plenary and supervisory jurisdiction over a support proceeding until its judgment is completely satisfied … .

Family Court Act § 460(1)(e) provides that, where a party has defaulted in paying any sum of money due as required by an order directing such payment, the court shall make an order directing the entry of a judgment for the amount of child support arrears, “unless the defaulting party shows good cause for failure to make application for relief from the judgment or order directing such payment prior to the accrual of such arrears.” However, Family Court Act § 460(3) also makes clear that the entry of a money judgment is a form of relief mandated “in addition to any and every other remedy which may be provided under the law including, but not limited to, the remedies provided under the provisions of section four hundred fifty-four of this act” (Family Ct Act § 460[3]). The remedies provided by Family Court Act § 454 include a provision authorizing the court to commit a respondent to jail for a term not exceeding six months upon a finding that the respondent has willfully failed to obey any lawful order of support (see Family Ct Act § 454[3][a]). Matter of Damadeo v Keller, 2015 NY Slip Op 07267, 2nd Dept 10-7-15

 

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