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Requirements of Adverse Possession by “Tacking” Explained (Not Met Here)

In affirming the grant of defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint claiming adverse possession of a strip of land, the Second Department explained the requirements for adverse possession by “tacking” the possession of prior owners:

A party claiming adverse possession may establish possession for the statutory period by “tacking” the time that the party possessed the property onto the time that the party’s predecessor adversely possessed the property … . Tacking is permitted where there is an “unbroken chain of privity between the adverse possessors” … . For tacking to apply, a party must show that the party’s predecessor “intended to and actually turned over possession of the undescribed part with the portion of the land included in the deed” … . In order to succeed on a claim of adverse possession, a party must provide clear and convincing evidence that the possession was “hostile and under a claim of right”; (2) actual; (3) open and notorious; (4) exclusive; and (5) “continuous for the statutory period of 10 years” … . The party must also show that the disputed property was “usually cultivated or improved” or “protected by a substantial inclosure” (RPAPL former § 522 …). Munroe v Cheyenne Realty, LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 06902, 2nd Dept 9-23-15

 

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