You are here: / / Use of an Address to Which the Respondent Was in the Process of Moving...

Use of an Address to Which the Respondent Was in the Process of Moving Did Not Constitute a False Statement within the Meaning of the Election Law

In an action seeking to invalidate a nominating petition, the Fourth Department determined the respondent (a candidate for Common Council Member in Utica) did not provide a false address when she witnessed signatures on her nominating petition. Respondent was in the process of moving to the address used on the petition. Although she had spent time at the new address, the certificate of occupancy for the property had not yet been issued and she, therefore, could not yet formally reside there. The Fourth Department explained the law relevant to the use of an address where one intends to reside:

We explained in Matter of McManus v Relin (286 AD2d 855, lv denied 96 NY2d 718) that where, as here, “[t]he witness was in the process of moving from one apartment to another during the period in which signatures were being obtained and he provided his new address as a current address on . . . designating petitions signed before he actually moved,” the witness complied with Election Law § 6-132 (2). Although respondent had not yet moved to the address at the time she witnessed the signatures, the record establishes that the address was intended to be “that place where [she] maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home” (§ 1-104 [22]). “The determination of an individual’s residence is dependent upon an individual’s expressed intent and conduct …, and we conclude that the record establishes that respondent’s conduct reflects her intent that the address is her residence …, despite her inability to move in for reasons beyond her control. Thus, the witness statement using that address does not, under the circumstances of this case, constitute “a material false statement” (§ 6-132 [2]), and there is no indication of fraud … . Where an alleged impropriety “does not involve the substantive requirements of witness eligibility[,]’ [i.e., that respondent is a duly qualified voter of the state and an enrolled voter of the same political party as the voters qualified to sign the petition] and there is no implication of fraud, resort to strict construction should be avoided if it would lead to injustice in the electoral process or the public perception of it’ ” … . We therefore conclude, contrary to petitioner’s contention, that strict construction of Election Law § 6-132 (2) is not necessary with respect to respondent’s specification of the address on the witness statement. Matter of Vescera v Karp, 2015 NY Slip Op 06755, 4th Dept 9-8-15

 

You might also like
Allegations that Town Was Negligent in Maintaining a Sewer System Involve a Proprietary Function Subject to Ordinary Rules of Negligence
“Arbitrary and Capricious” Defined/Criteria for Elimination of a Public-Employee Position Explained
EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD, NEGLECT DETERMINATION CANNOT STAND (FOURTH DEPT).
THE MAJORITY NOTED THAT A DECISION IS NOT AN APPEALABLE PAPER BUT HELD THE DECISION HERE IN THIS DIVORCE CASE MET THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN ORDER AND WAS THEREFORE APPEALABLE; THE DISSENT DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT).
PETITIONER, WHO HAD WORKED FOR THE TOWN FOR 32 YEARS, TOOK $181 FROM PETTY CASH AND LEFT A NOTE INDICATING SHE OWED MONEY TO THE FUND; THE LARCENY AND THEFT CHARGES WERE ANNULLED; TERMINATION WAS TOO SEVERE A PUNISHMENT; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY SHE WAS NOT TICKETED; DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INCREASED UNCONDITIONALLY BY THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE PROPER PROCEDURE IS TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL UNLESS DEFENDANT STIPULATES TO THE INCREASED DAMAGES (FOURTH DEPT).
THE TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THAT THE MAJORITY ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO VACATE THE CONVICTION ON A GROUND NOT RELIED UPON BY THE MOTION COURT (FOURTH DEPT). ​
FATHER DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT ARREARS PROCEEDING, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Flight Crew Member Deemed an Employee of a Service Which Provides Flight Crews... Insurer Must Demonstrate Compliance with 30-Day Notice Requirement Re: an Independent...