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Security at Homeless Shelter Is a Governmental Function–City Immune from Suit by Plaintiff Who Was Assaulted at the Shelter/Private Security Company Not Immune/Plaintiff Was a Third-Party Beneficiary of the Contract Between the Department of Homeless Services and the Security Company/Security Company Did Not Demonstrate It Was Free from Negligence and the Assault Was Not Foreseeable

The Second Department determined the city and the Department of Homeless Services (DHS) were immune from suit by plaintiff, who was assaulted in a city homeless shelter. The city’s obligation to provide security is a governmental function for which it cannot be held liable absent a special relationship with the plaintiff (not the case here).  However, the private security company, FJC  was not immune from suit. Plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between DHS and FJC. FJC was not entitled to summary judgment because it failed to demonstrate it was not negligent and the attack was not foreseeable:

The plaintiff’s theory of recovery was premised upon the alleged failure of the municipal defendants to provide an adequate and proper security force to prevent attacks by third parties at the homeless shelter where the subject incident occurred. Such a claim, however, implicates a governmental function, liability for the performance of which is barred absent the breach of a special duty owed to the injured party … . Here, the municipal defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they owed no special duty of care to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Therefore, that branch of the municipal defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them was properly granted … . …

However, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the motion of the defendant FJC Security Services, Inc. (hereinafter FJC), which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Contrary to its contention, FJC, a private, for-profit contractor of security services, is not entitled to governmental immunity … . In addition, the plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between FJC and DHS. The provisions of the contract between FJC and DHS unequivocally express an intent to confer a direct benefit on the homeless clients in residence at the City shelter, such as the plaintiff, to protect them from physical injury. Thus, in order to prevail on its motion for summary judgment, FJC was required to demonstrate, prima facie, that there were no triable issues of fact as to whether it was negligent in the performance of its duties, or that the assault on the plaintiff was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of any breach of its duties … .  FJC failed to demonstrate either. Clark v City of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 06307, 2nd Dept 7-29-15

 

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