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Order of Protection Reversed–Family Court Did Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Party Ordered to Stay Away Was Not Related to, a Member of the Household of, or in an Intimate Relationship With, the Subject of the Order of Protection

The Second Department determined Family Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Family Court Act 812 and could not, therefore, issue an order of protection to a person, Kirton, who was not a party to a family offense proceeding. Family Court’s jurisdiction in a family offense proceeding is limited to certain acts which occur “between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household” (Family Ct Act § 812[1]…). [M]embers of the same family or household include, among others, persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time… ” [internal quotation marks omitted] Here the party to whom the order of protection was issued, Kirton, was not related in any way to, was not a member of the household of, and did not have an intimate relationship with the petitioner, Cambre (from whom Kirton was ordered to stay away):

The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, constrained to exercise only those powers conferred upon it by the New York Constitution or by statute … . Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812(1), the Family Court’s jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur “between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household” (Family Ct Act § 812[1]…). “[M]embers of the same family or household” include, among others, “persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time” … .

Here, Kirton and Cambre have no direct relationship … . The record … demonstrates that they met for the first time during the course of the court proceedings, and have no ongoing relationship … . Accordingly, the undisputed facts establish that there is no “intimate relationship” between the parties within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e)… . Consequently, since the parties do not have an “intimate relationship” within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812 (1)(e), the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the order of protection must be reversed, the petition denied, and the proceeding dismissed. Matter of Cambre v Kirton, 2015 NY Slip Op 06242, 2nd Dept 7-22-15 

 

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