You are here: / / Court of Claims Must Determine the Interests of All Parties Named by the...
, ,

Court of Claims Must Determine the Interests of All Parties Named by the Attorney General as Potentially Entitled to Payment for a Taking by the State—Therefore a Claimant Must Join all the Parties Named by the Attorney General

The Second Department explained the procedure under the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) for determining how to apportion payment for a taking when there is a dispute about which parties are entitled to payment. Under the EDPL and the Court of Claims Act, the Court of Claims must determine the interests of all parties named by the Attorney General as having a possible claim. Therefore a claimant must join all the named parties in any action seeking payment:

EDPL 304(E)(1) … provides that when the Attorney General determines that there is a conflict with regard to the person or persons legally entitled to receive payment for the value of property acquired by the State through the power of eminent domain, he or she shall request the Comptroller to deposit the funds in an interest-bearing account “to be distributed as ordered by the Court of Claims on application of any person claiming an interest in the amount” (EDPL 304[E][1]). The statute further provides that the procedure to be employed in connection with such an application “shall be the same as provided in [Court of Claims Act § 23],” and that “[n]o judgment of distribution shall be made unless the court shall first obtain personal jurisdiction over all persons certified by the Attorney General as having or claiming to have an interest in the fund” (EDPL 304[E][1]).

The claimant argues, in effect, that Mazur Brothers, Inc. (hereinafter MBI), an entity that the Attorney General has determined has a possible interest in the subject proceeds, does not in fact have any such interest and that, therefore, the claimant was under no obligation to join MBI as a party to this claim. In advancing this argument, however, the claimant essentially asked the Court of Claims to assume the very fact that is the ultimate fact that must be proven, namely, that MBI has no interest in the money deposited by the Comptroller. Without jurisdiction over MBI, it would have been improper for the Court of Claims to grant the relief requested by the claimant in connection with this claim. Indeed, as the claimant appears to have recognized, its remedy, under these circumstances, lies in a special distribution proceeding pursuant to EDPL 304 … . Mazur Bros. Realty, LLC v State of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 06119, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

You might also like
Plaintiff Should Have Been Allowed to Add Doctor to Medical Malpractice Action After the Statute of Limitations Had Run—All the Relation-Back Criteria Were Met
Analytical Criteria Re: Res Judicata and the Interpretation of a Release Explained
IT WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF DISCRETION TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE FOR THE FORECLOSURE SALE DUE TO THE COVID PANDEMIC; HOWEVER IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DENY THE MOTION TO TOLL THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST DURING THE DELAY (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTION DID NOT REQUIRE SUMMARY DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEAL THE RECORDS OF HIS NEW YORK CONVICTION; HOWEVER, THE OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTION MUST BE PART OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF SEALING THE NEW YORK RECORDS; SUPREME COURT GRANTED THE MOTION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTION; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF FELL 15 TO 20 FEET SUFFERING A FRACTURED RIB AND A FRACTURED FEMUR WHICH REQUIRED AN OPEN REDUCTION AND INTERNAL FIXATION SURGERY; THE VERDICT AWARDING $1.5 MILLION FOR PAST PAIN AND SUFFERING, $2.5 MILLION FOR FUTURE PAIN AND SUFFERING, AND $800,000 FOR FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS EXCESSIVE (SECOND DEPT).
Questions of Fact Whether Hospital Liable for Independent Actions of Its Employees Under Respondeat Superior and Negligent Hiring/Retention Theories
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER LOCATION OF THE DOORWAY AND THE STAIRWAY PILLAR, WHICH WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, WAS AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS CONDITION, DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
MOTHER BROUGHT A PETITION TO MODIFY CUSTODY AND ALLEGED SHE DID NOT CONSENT TO THE STIPULATION UNDERLYING THE EXISTING CUSTODY ORDER; BECAUSE THE STIPULATION WAS NOT IN THE RECORD AND ITS TERMS WERE NOT IN THE CUSTODY ORDER, A HEARING WAS REQUIRED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Criteria for Vicarious Liability of Hospital for Actions of Non-Employee Physician... Failure to Affirmatively Demonstrate When the Area Where the Slip and Fall Occurred...