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City Had Not Impliedly Dedicated Certain Parcels of Land as Public Parklands—Therefore the Parcels, Which Had Been Used as Public Parks, Were Not Protected by the Public Trust Doctrine and Could Be Sold by the City Without the Approval of the State Legislature

The Court of Appeals determined certain city-owned parcels of land which had been used as public parkland had not been impliedly dedicated as public parklands.  Therefore the parcels were not under the protection of the public trust doctrine and could be sold by the city without the approval of the state legislature:

In support of their appeal, petitioners again advance their argument that the City’s actions manifest its intent to impliedly dedicate the parcels as parkland. Under the public trust doctrine, a land owner cannot alienate land that has been impliedly dedicated to a public use without obtaining the approval of the Legislature … . A party seeking to establish such an implied dedication and thereby successfully challenge the alienation of the land must show that: (1) “[t]he acts and declarations by the land owner indicating the intent to dedicate his land to the public use [are] unmistakable in their purpose and decisive in their character to have the effect of a dedication” and (2) that the public has accepted the land as dedicated to a public use … .

It remains an open question whether the second prong of the implied dedication doctrine applies to a municipal land owner, but we need not and do not resolve that issue on this appeal because we conclude that the City’s acts are not an unequivocal manifestation of an intent to dedicate the parcels as permanent parkland. With respect to the element of the owner’s intent — the only matter contested in this appeal — if a landowner’s acts are “equivocal, or do not clearly and plainly indicate the intention to permanently abandon the property to the use of the public, they are insufficient to establish a case of dedication” … . * * *

Here, as the Appellate Division noted, several documents created prior to this litigation demonstrate that the City did not manifest an unequivocal intent to dedicate the contested parcels for use as public parks. The permit, memorandum of understanding and lease/license relating to Mercer Playground, LaGuardia Park and LaGuardia Corners Gardens, respectively, show that “any management of the parcels by the [DPR] was understood to be temporary and provisional” … . Thus, those documents’ restrictive terms show that, although the City permitted and encouraged some use of these three parcels for recreational and park-like purposes, it had no intention of permanently giving up control of the property. And, as the Appellate Division observed, “the City’s “refus[al of] various requests to have the streets de-mapped and re-dedicated as parkland” … further indicates that the City has not unequivocally manifested an intent to dedicate the parcels as parkland. Matter of Glick v Harvey, 2015 NY Slip Op 05593, CtApp 6-30-15

 

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