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Question of Fact About Sequence of Rear-End Collisions Precluded Summary Judgment

The Second Department determined a question of fact had been raised about whether the middle driver in a three-car rear-end collision was negligent. Although the middle-car driver alleged she was struck from behind and pushed into the lead car, the third-car driver alleged the middle car struck the lead car before he struck the middle car:

Supreme Court erred in granting the motions of the plaintiff [lead car driver] and [the middle-car driver] for summary judgment. Based on the plaintiff’s account of the accident, those movants established, prima facie, their freedom from comparative fault and that [third-car driver] was negligent based on the presumption of negligence that arises from a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle … . However, [third-car driver’s] affidavit, which recited that his vehicle only struck the [middle] vehicle after the [middle] vehicle had already collided with the lead vehicle, raised triable issues of fact as to the sequence of the collisions, whether [the middle-car driver] was at fault, and the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries …. . Gavrilova v Stark, 2015 NY Slip Op 05153, 2nd Dept 6-17-15

 

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