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Defendant’s Employee Had “Apparent Authority” to Act on Behalf of Defendant Insurance Agency—Plaintiff Justifiably Relied on the Apparent Authority When It Purchased a Fake Policy from Defendant’s Employee–Plaintiff Entitled to Partial Summary Judgment on the Fraud Cause of Action

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on its fraud cause of action against defendant insurance agency.  An employee of the insurance agency issued a fake workers’ compensation policy to the plaintiff. The Fourth Department found that the actions of the insurance agency provided the employee with “apparent authority” to issue the policy and the plaintiff justifiably relied on that apparent authority.  The relevant law was succinctly explained:

“In an action to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff must prove a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by [the maker], made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury” … . It is undisputed that the insurance policy purportedly issued by AIG was false, and thus plaintiff established that a false representation was made that was known to be false by defendant’s employee. Defendant contends, however, that the justifiable reliance element was not met because it cannot be liable for the acts of its employee, and plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged “apparent authority” of defendant’s employee was not reasonable.

It is axiomatic that “[t]he mere creation of an agency for some purpose does not automatically invest the agent with apparent authority’ to bind the principle without limitation . . . An agent’s power to bind his [or her] principal is coextensive with the principal’s grant of authority” … . “Essential to the creation of apparent authority are words or conduct of the principal, communicated to the third party, that give rise to the appearance and belief that the agent possesses authority to enter into a transaction. The agent cannot by his [or her] own acts imbue himself [or herself] with apparent authority. Rather, the existence of “apparent authority” depends upon a factual showing that the third party relied upon the misrepresentation of the agent because of some misleading conduct on the part of the principal — not the agent’ . . . Morever, a third party with whom the agent deals may rely on an appearance of authority only to the extent that such reliance is reasonable” … . Here, plaintiff contacted defendant seeking workers’ compensation coverage, and defendant assigned its employee who specialized in plaintiff’s type of business to assist plaintiff. We therefore conclude that plaintiff established that it reasonably relied upon the authority of defendant’s employee to act for defendant. Regency Oaks Corp. v Norman-Spencer McKernan, Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 04959, 4th Dept 6-12-15

 

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