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Where a Defendant Has Been Convicted of an Armed Felony or an Enumerated Sex Offense Pursuant to CPL (Criminal Procedure Law) 720.10(2)a)(ii ie (iii), Even If the Defendant Has Not Requested or Has Explicitly Waived “Youthful Offender” Status, the Court Must Determine, On the Record, Whether Mitigating Circumstances Exist, and, If So, Must Determine On the Record Whether the Defendant Should Be Adjudicated a Youthful Offender

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a partial three-judge dissent, determined “when a defendant has been convicted of an armed felony or an enumerated sex offense pursuant to CPL 720.10 (2) (a) (ii) or (iii), and the only barrier to his or her youthful offender eligibility is that conviction, the court is required to determine on the record whether the defendant is an eligible youth by considering the presence or absence of the factors set forth in CPL 720.10 (3). The court must make such a determination on the record ‘even where [the] defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to make such a request’ pursuant to a plea bargain … . If the court determines, in its discretion, that neither of the CPL 720.10 (3) factors exist and states the reasons for that determination on the record, no further determination by the court is required. If, however, the court determines that one or more of the CPL 720.10 (3) factors are present, and the defendant is therefore an eligible youth, the court then ‘must determine whether or not the eligible youth is a youthful offender’ (CPL 720.20 [1]).” People v Middlebrooks, 2015 NY Slip Op 04875, CtApp 6-11-15

 

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