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The Three-Year Statute of Limitations in the Education Law Need Not Be Raised as a Defense—Here the Charges Against a Teacher Were Time-Barred—The Department of Education (DOE) Did Not Demonstrate the Charges Were Criminal (to Which the Three-Year Statute Would Not Have Applied)

The First Department determined the third set of charges brought against petitioner-teacher, alleging the teacher improperly obtained his daughter’s admission to NYC Department of Education (DOE) schools for which she was not zoned, was time-barred.  Although the three-year statute of limitations in the Education Law would not apply had the allegations constituted a crime, the hearing officer did not find the teacher’s conduct to be criminal. The court determined that the first two set of charges against the teacher did not justify termination (the penalty imposed) and remitted the matter for a lesser punishment. The court noted that the statute of limitations in the Education Law need not be raised as a defense:

Supreme Court did not exceed its authority in finding that the third set of charges against petitioner was time-barred. Education Law § 3020-a(1) requires that disciplinary charges against a teacher be brought within three years from the date of the alleged misconduct, unless the alleged misconduct constituted a crime when committed. Petitioner was not required to raise the statutory time limitation set forth in Education Law § 3020-a(1) as a defense in the disciplinary proceeding. Where, as here, “a statute creates a right unknown at common law, and also establishes a time period within which the right may be asserted, the time limit is . . . a condition attached to the right as distinguished from a [s]tatute of [l]imitations which must be asserted by way of defense” … . Accordingly, DOE had the burden of establishing that it met the time requirement set forth in Education Law § 3020-a(1) or that the crime exception to the time requirement applied … . DOE failed to meet its burden. Matter of Suker v New York City Board/ Dept. of Educ., 2015 NY Slip Op 04940, 1st Dept 6-11-15

 

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