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Question of Fact Whether a Building Manager Owed a Duty to Plaintiff—Plaintiff, a Sidewalk Pedestrian, Was Struck by Window-Washing Equipment—The Window Washing Service Was an Independent Contractor Hired by the Building Manager—Question of Fact Raised Whether a Duty to the Plaintiff Ran from the Building Manager Because of the Inherently Dangerous Work the Independent Contractor Was Hired to Do and Because of the Nature of the Contract Between the Building Manager and the Building Owner—The Court Noted that the Property Owners Were Not Liable Because Ownership and Control of the Building on the Property Had Been Transferred (to the Building Owner)

The Second Department determined there was a question of fact whether a building manager (Milford) who hired a window washing service (Red Cap) could be liable for injury to a pedestrian (plaintiff) struck by a piece of window-washing equipment which fell. Although Red Cap was an independent contractor, plaintiff raised a question of fact about whether Milford owed a nondelegable duty to plaintiff because the work it hired Red Cap to do was inherently dangerous (in the absence of warning signs and pedestrian barriers) and whether the building management services contract between Milford and the building-owner (S & P) was sufficiently comprehensive and exclusive to create a duty running to plaintiff. The court noted that the property owners were not liable because ownership and control of the building (on the property) had been transferred (to the building-owner):

Milford established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting proof that Red Cap was an independent contractor and, thus, it could not be held liable for Red Cap’s negligent acts …, and that, as S & P’s contractual managing agent, it owed no duty to the plaintiff … . However, in opposition, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether Milford owed a nondelegable duty to the plaintiff because it knew or had reason to know that the work it hired Red Cap to perform was inherently dangerous to pedestrians in the absence of warning signs or barriers on the sidewalk below the window-washing apparatus …, and whether the property management services agreement with S & P was sufficiently comprehensive and exclusive so as support a duty running to the plaintiff … . Baek v Red Cap Servs., Ltd., 2015 NY Slip Op 04794, 2nd Dept 6-10-15

 

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