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Injury Caused by an Unsecured Scaffolding Component Which Fell Approximately Two-Feet, Striking Plaintiff, Was Not the Type of Elevation-Related Risk Which Is Covered by Labor Law 240 (1)

Plaintiff was injured when a component of scaffolding fell about two-feet and struck him.  The Third Department determined the incident was not the result of a circumstance covered by Labor Law 240 (1) (the absence of statutorily-required safety equipment), even though the incident was “gravity-related.”  However, the Labor Law 246 (1) cause of action, alleging a violation of a provision of the Industrial Code, and the Labor Law 200 cause of action against the general contractor which supervised and controlled the work, should not have been dismissed. With respect ot the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action, the court explained:

Labor Law § 240 (1) “imposes absolute liability on building owners and contractors whose failure to ‘provide proper protection to workers employed on a construction site’ proximately causes injury to a worker” … . The statute is intended to provide “extraordinary protections [applicable] only to a narrow class of dangers. More specifically, [the statute] relates only to special hazards presenting elevation-related risks” … . Accordingly, “section 240 (1) does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker; ‘[a] plaintiff must show that the object fell . . . because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute'” … . Where, as here, an injury is caused by a falling object, liability “depends on whether the injured worker’s task creates an elevation-related risk of the kind that the safety devices listed in section 240 (1) protect against” … . An elevation-related risk arises only where there is a “physically significant elevation differential” … . In order to determine whether a height differential is physically significant, we must consider “the weight of the object and the amount of force it was capable of generating, even over the course of a relatively short descent” … . Without a significant elevation differential, Labor Law § 240 (1) does not apply, even if the injury is caused by the application of gravity on an object … .

Here, “tak[ing] into account the practical differences between the usual and ordinary dangers of a construction site, and . . . the extraordinary elevation risks envisioned by [the statute],” as we must …, we find that plaintiff’s injury, caused by the tipping frame or scaffold component (see 12 NYCRR 23-1.4), did not fall within the scope of Labor Law § 240 (1). Our conclusion remains even if we accept it to be true that the frame was part of a scaffold that was in the process of being assembled or dismantled … . The record indicates that, at most, the crossbar of the frame, which was upright but not connected to any other component or supporting any planking, was two feet above plaintiff’s head. In our view, the facts do not present a physically significant height differential and, while plaintiff was exposed to a general workplace hazard, he was not exposed to an elevation-related risk within the ambit of Labor Law § 240 (1) … . As such, this cause of action should be dismissed. Christiansen v Bonacio Constr., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 04700, 3rd Dept 6-4-15

 

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