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To Succeed In a Legal Malpractice Action Stemming from Representation in a Criminal Matter, the Plaintiff Must Have a Colorable Claim of Actual Innocence—Elements of Legal Malpractice in this Context Explained

The Second Department determined defendant-attorney’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice complaint should have been granted.  Plaintiff, when represented by defendant-attorney, was convicted of sex offenses. The conviction was overturned on “ineffective assistance of counsel” grounds.  Plaintiff was acquitted upon retrial. In the legal malpractice action, the plaintiff was unable to prove the element of causation.  Defendant-attorney demonstrated plaintiff’s conviction was not due solely to defendant-attorney’s conduct, but was based in part on plaintiff’s “guilt,” in that her children provided graphic testimony alleging sexual abuse. To succeed in a legal malpractice action stemming from a criminal matter, the plaintiff must at least have a colorable claim of actual innocence.  In addition, the nonpecuniary damages sought by the plaintiff (psychological injury due to her incarceration) are not recoverable in a legal malpractice action.  The Second Department explained the elements of legal malpractice in this context (stemming from representation in a criminal case):

To recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession, and that the breach of this duty proximately caused the plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages … . Even where a plaintiff establishes that his or her attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by members of the legal profession, the plaintiff must still demonstrate causation … . “To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the lawyer’s negligence” … . In the civil context, this Court has held that a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action “need prove only that the defendant-attorney’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages” … . However, in a legal malpractice action such as this one, arising from representation in a criminal matter, the “plaintiff must have at least a colorable claim of actual innocence” …, and the plaintiff ultimately bears the unique burden to plead and prove that his or her “conviction was due to the attorney’s actions alone and not due to some consequence of his [or her] guilt” … . ” To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant in a legal malpractice action must present evidence in admissible form establishing that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one of these essential elements'” … . Dawson v Schoenberg, 2015 NY Slip Op 04603, 2nd Dept 6-3-15

 

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