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Slippery Dock Was an Open and Obvious Condition—Landowner Had No Duty to Protect Against the Condition

Plaintiff was injured when he stepped on a dock from a boat.  Plaintiff alleged the dock was slippery. The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment because a landowner has no duty to protect against an open and obvious condition:

A landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining [its] property in a safe condition under all of the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the potential injuries, the burden of avoiding the risk, and the foreseeability of a potential plaintiff’s presence on the property” … . Here, the defendant met its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … . “[A] landowner has no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition that is inherent or incident to the nature of the property, and that could be reasonably anticipated by those using it” … . A slippery condition on a dock is necessarily incidental to its nature and location near a body of water … . Mossberg v Crow’s Nest Mar. of Oceanside, 2015 NY Slip Op 04618, 2nd Dept 6-3-15

 

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