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Installing, Pursuant to a Resolution, a Temporary Barrier to Address Traffic and Speeding Problems Did Not Violate the “Prior Public Use” Doctrine

The Second Department determined the town’s passing of a resolution installing a temporary barrier on a street to address complaints about traffic and speeding was proper.  Installing the barrier did not violate the “prior public use” doctrine because the barrier did not interfere with a prior public use:

The prior public use doctrine limits “the general grant of the power of eminent domain extended in Town Law § 64(2)” by prohibiting towns from “acquir[ing] rights in property already devoted to another public use where the acquisition will interfere with or destroy the prior public use” … . The subject breakaway barrier that the Town installed on Samuel Road did not interfere with or destroy the prior public use of Samuel Road. Accordingly, the prior public use doctrine is inapplicable, and does not prohibit the Town from installing the barrier … . Matter of County of Rockland v Town of Clarkstown, 2015 NY Slip Op 04314 2nd Dept 5-20-15

 

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