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Supreme Court Used the Wrong Standards When It Denied Petitioner’s Request for Documents Relating to Complaints Alleging the Improper Use of School Property by an Employee of the Department of Education (the Employee Gave a Speech on School Property Which May Have Violated the Chancellor’s Regulations re: the Use of School Property for Political Purposes)—Correct Analytical Criteria Explained and Applied

The First Department determined Supreme Court used the wrong criteria when it denied petitioner’s request for documents relating to the investigation of complaints about the use of school buildings for political purposes.  The complaints concerned a speech given by an employee of the Department of Education (DOE) which criticized the positions on education policy taken by unnamed mayoral candidates.  The speech was put up on the DOE website. Petitioner alleged the speech violated specified Chancellor’s Regulations re: the conduct of school employees with respect political campaigns and elections.  Supreme Court erroneously held that petitioner must show that the denial of the request for documents was “arbitrary and capricious,” “an abuse of discretion,” “irrational,” or “unlawful.”  The proper analysis is whether the determination “was affected by an error of law” and  places the burden on the respondent to show the request falls within one of the statutory exceptions to disclosure.  The First Department reversed Supreme Court, applied the correct analytical criteria and found that any relevant privacy interests did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure:

The appropriate standard of review is whether the determination “was affected by an error of law” (CPLR 7803[3]…). Moreover, the burden is on respondents to establish “that the material requested falls squarely within the ambit of one of the[] statutory exemptions” from disclosure … . Under the circumstances of this case, the application of an improper legal standard is reversible error since it resulted in substantial prejudice to petitioner … .

Respondents failed to establish that disclosure of the materials at issue would “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under the provisions of [§ 89(2)]” (Public Officers Law § 87[2][b]). They do not claim that any personal privacy category enumerated in § 89(2) is applicable. Therefore, we must determine whether any invasion of personal privacy would be unwarranted “by balancing the privacy interests at stake against the public interest in disclosure of the information” … . The speech at issue excoriated unspecified candidates in the 2013 mayoral election who had taken certain positions on education policy. Notwithstanding that the speech did not name any individual candidate or political party, the complaints to [the school district]  raised serious questions about the propriety of the speech and its publication on DOE’s website. We find that there is a “significant public interest” in the requested materials, which may shed light on whether this matter was adequately investigated … . Respondents failed to establish that the claimed privacy interests outweigh this public interest … . They assert that the materials contain personally identifying information such as home addresses, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers. However, that information can be redacted and does not provide a basis for withholding entire documents … . . Matter of Thomas v Condon, 2015 NY Slip Op 04237, 1st Dept 5-19-15

 

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