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Owner of Animal Which Strays Can Be Liable in Tort for Related Motorcycle Accident

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed.  Plaintiff’s decedent was killed when his motorcycle struck a cow which had wandered off defendant’s land:

The Court [of Appeals has] held that “a landowner or the owner of an animal may be liable under ordinary tort-law principles when a farm animal—i.e., a domestic animal as that term is defined in Agriculture and Markets Law § 108 (7)—is negligently allowed to stray from the property on which the animal is kept” … . Sargent v Mammoser, 2014 NY Slip Op 03372, 4th Dept 5-9-14

 

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INCOMPLETE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFINITION OF ‘BUILDING’ REQUIRED A NEW TRIAL IN THIS BURGLARY PROSECUTION (FOURTH DEPT).
A DEFENDANT WHO REQUESTS A RESTITUTION HEARING IS ENTITLED TO ONE, EVEN WHERE A HEARING HAD BEEN HELD AFTER DEFENDANT’S FIRST TRIAL (FOURTH DEPT).
THE SOLE REMEDY WHEN A CONVICTION IS DEEMED AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT, REDUCTION TO A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE.
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