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Person Injured After Being Thrown from a Motorcycle Is an “Occupant” of the Motorcycle Within the Meaning of the Insurance Law and Is Therefore Not Eligible for First-Party No-Fault Benefits

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Sconiers, determined a person injured after being thrown from a motorcycle was an “occupant” of the motorcycle within the meaning of the Insurance Law and therefore ineligible for first-party no-fault benefits:

Previously, motorcycle operators and passengers injured in motor vehicle accidents were generally entitled to first-party benefits under the no-fault law. Former section 672 (1) (a) of the Insurance Law provided that those entitled to first-party benefits under the no-fault scheme encompassed “persons, other than occupants of another motor vehicle.” That category included motorcyclists on a par with pedestrians … . The statute was amended in 1977 to exclude occupants of motorcycles from such benefits (see L 1977, ch 892, § 9), thereby terminating the treatment of motorcycle occupants “as pedestrians rather than motorists [who] enjoy the benefits of no-fault at no cost” … . The successor of the amended statute, Insurance Law § 5103 (a) (1), currently provides that, under a policy of insurance issued on an automobile, first-party benefits are available to “[p]ersons, other than occupants of another motor vehicle or a motorcycle” … . The exclusions in the Kemper and Farm and Family insurance policies of “any person while occupying a motorcycle” are consistent with Insurance Law § 5103 (a) (1) and the regulations promulgated thereunder (see 11 NYCRR 65-1.1 [d]). Boyson v Kwasowsky, 2015 NY Slip Op 03964, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

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