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Former Parishioners Did Not Have Standing to Challenge Sale of Church Property Which Had Been Authorized by Supreme Court Pursuant to the Religious Corporation Law

The Third Department determined former parishioners of a church should not have brought an action for declaratory judgment contesting the church’s (court-ordered) authorization to sell church property pursuant to the Religious Corporation Law.  The proper procedure would have been to bring a motion to intervene pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a).  The  court went on to determine that the parishioners did not have standing to challenge the sale because they were not members of the religious corporation:

Plaintiffs’ action was an impermissible collateral attack on the authorization order. The proper procedure would have been to move to vacate that order pursuant to CPLR 5015, which permits “any interested person” to move for such relief (CPLR 5015 [a]), rather than commencing a second plenary action collaterally attacking an order in a prior action … . …

Additionally, Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint because plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the sale of the property. Plaintiffs may have been members of the congregation or “ecclesiastical body” of St. Patrick’s, but that does not make them members of the religious corporation … . “Member” is defined for religious corporation purposes as “one having membership rights in a corporation in accordance with the provisions of its certificate of incorporation or by-laws” (N-PCL 102 [a] [9]; see Religious Corporations Law § 2-b [1]). Pursuant to the incorporation documents and bylaws of St. Patrick’s and the relevant statutes, St. Patrick’s is managed by a five-member board of trustees consisting of the diocesan bishop, the vicar general of the diocese, the rector of the church and two laypersons selected by the other trustees (see Religious Corporations Law §§ 90, 91)[FN3]. Religious Corporations Law § 5 “vests the custody and control of a religious corporation’s [*3]real property in the board of trustees” … . As plaintiffs are not members of the religious corporation, they lack standing to challenge decisions concerning the transfer of the corporation’s property … . Citizens for St Patrick’s v Saint Patrick’s Church of W Troy, 2014 NY Slip Op 03314, 3rd Dept 5-8-14

 

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