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Most of Plaintiff’s Causes of Action Were Allegations Concerning the Conduct of a State Employee in His Official Capacity—Therefore, Those Causes of Action Were Actually Against the State and Could Only Be Heard in the Court of Claims/Elements of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Explained

The Second Department upheld the dismissal of several causes of action (brought in Supreme Court) which were determined to constitute actions against the state because they were directed at the official conduct of an individual employed by the state. Actions against the state can be heard only in the Court of Claims. The suit was brought by a doctor employed by the SUNY Downstate Medical Center and alleged breach of contract, wrongful termination of employment, promissory estoppel, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Second Department concluded that only defamation should survive because that cause of action was against plaintiff’s boss, Dr. Abulafia, in his individual, not official, capacity.  The intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, which was also against Dr. Abulafia in his individual capacity, was dismissed because it was not sufficiently alleged:

“The Court of Claims has limited jurisdiction to hear actions against the State itself, or actions naming State agencies or officials as defendants, where the action is, in reality, one against the State—i.e., where the State is the real party in interest” … . Generally, “[t]he Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for money damages against State agencies, departments, and employees acting in their official capacity in the exercise of governmental functions” … . “Where, however, the suit against the State agent or officer is in tort for damages arising from the breach of a duty owed individually by such agent or officer directly to the injured party, the State is not the real party in interest—even though it could be held secondarily liable for the tortious acts under respondeat superior” … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were to dismiss the causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract, wrongful termination of employment, and promissory estoppel insofar as asserted against Abulafia, correctly concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain those cases of action insofar as asserted against Abulafia, as those causes of action arose from acts performed, and determinations made, by Abulafia as a State employee acting in his official capacity… . * * *

“In order to state a cause of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the complaint must allege conduct that was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . and [was] utterly intolerable in a civilized community'” … . Even accepting as true the allegations in the complaint regarding Abulafia’s conduct, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference …, Abulafia’s conduct was not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree” as to qualify as intentional infliction of emotional distress … .  Borawski v Abulafia, 2014 NY Slip Op 03221, 2nd Dept 5-7-14

 

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