You are here: / / General Permit System by Which Smaller Communities Obtain Authorization...

General Permit System by Which Smaller Communities Obtain Authorization to Discharge Stormwater Does Not Violate Federal or State Law

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, over a three-judge partial dissent, determined that the system by which smaller municipalities can obtain authorization for stormwater discharge without a public hearing did not violate federal or state law. The court's own overview of this very complex opinion provides the best summary:

Runoff from rain and snow melt courses over roofs, roads, driveways and other surfaces, picking up pollutants along the way. It then passes through municipal storm sewer systems into rivers and lakes, adding the pollutants accumulated during its journey to those bodies of water. These municipal storm sewer systems thus differ from other entities that discharge effluents into our State's surface waters (for example, industrial or commercial facilities and sewage treatment plants) in three major ways: precipitation is naturally occurring, intermittent and variable and cannot be stopped; although municipalities operate sewer systems, stormwater contamination results from the often unforeseen or unpredictable choices of individual residents and businesses (for example, to let litter pile up or to use certain lawn fertilizers), as well as decisions made long ago about the design of roads, parking lots and buildings; and because stormwater runoff flows into surface waters through tens of thousands of individual outfalls, each locality's contribution to the pollution of a particular river or lake is difficult to ascertain or allocate through numeric limitations.

Federal and state law prohibit discharges of stormwater from New York's municipal separate storm sewer systems in urbanized areas (referred to as MS4s) without authorization under a State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit. As an alternative to an individual SPDES permit, municipal separate storm sewer systems that serve a population under 100,000 (or small MS4s) may seek to discharge stormwater under a SPDES general permit. The 2010 General Permit — the subject of this lawsuit — requires these municipal systems to develop, document and implement a Stormwater Management Program (SWMP) in compliance with detailed specifications developed by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC or the Department) to limit the introduction of pollutants into stormwater to the maximum extent practicable. To obtain initial coverage (i.e., authorization to discharge) under the terms of the 2010 General Permit, small MS4s must first submit a complete and accurate notice of intention (NOI) to DEC.

After the 2010 General Permit took effect on May 1st of that year, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and seven other environmental advocacy groups (collectively, NRDC) brought this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action against DEC to challenge certain aspects of the 2010 General Permit. NRDC claims generally that by allowing small MS4s to gain coverage under the 2010 General Permit based upon an NOI reviewed only for completeness and not subject to an opportunity for a public hearing, DEC has created an “impermissible self-regulatory system” that fails to force local governments to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable — the statutory standard — and violates federal and state law [FN2]. Equating NOIs with applications for individual SPDES permits, Supreme Court granted partial relief to NRDC (35 Misc 3d 652 [Sup Ct Westchester County 2012]). The Appellate Division, as relevant here, rejected NRDC's federal and state law challenges to the 2010 General Permit (120 AD3d 1235 [2d Dept 2014]). We granted NRDC leave to appeal (23 NY3d 901 [2014]), and now affirm. Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 2015 NY Slip Op 03766, CtApp 5-7-15

 

You might also like
Hotel Room Occupancy Tax On Online Hotel Reservations Okay
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS MADE AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPORTATION MONTHS BEFORE HE PLED GUILTY, HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT INFORM HIM OF THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA WAS SUBJECT TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE ERROR PRECLUDED APPEAL (CT APP).
HERE THE DEFENDANT CLAIMED HE ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE WHEN HE STABBED THE VICTIM WITH A PEN KNIFE; THE DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE; THE TRIAL JUDGE INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE BUT DID NOT ALLOW EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THAT ISSUE; THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED, UPHOLDING THE RULE THAT THE VICTIM’S PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF JUSTIFICATION UNLESS THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT (CT APP).
KINGS COUNTY SUPREME COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE EAVESDROPPING WARRANTS FOR DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONES BASED UPON WHERE THE INTERCEPTION WAS TO BE MADE (NEW YORK); THE CELL PHONES NEED NOT BE (AND WERE NOT) LOCATED IN NEW YORK (CT APP).
Plea to a Lesser Offense Need Not Be Supported by Facts Admitted in a Plea Allocution—Court’s Unnecessary Attempt to Have Defendant Admit to Facts in Support of All of the Elements of the Lesser Offense Required Vacation of the Plea
Because the Landlord Engaged in Fraud, the Four-Year Rent-Overcharge Statute of Limitations Runs Back Four Years from When the Rent Overcharge Action Was Brought/Criteria for Collateral Estoppel Explained (Not Met Here)/Question of Fact Re: Piercing Corporate Veil
Petitioner Did Not Demonstrate Diminution in Value Related to Presence of Lead Paint Re: Tax Assessments
THE INTERSATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN (ICPC) APPLIES ONLY TO PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE OR PLACEMENT RELATED TO ADOPTION; THEREFORE THE ICPC DID NOT APPLY HERE WHERE FATHER, A NORTH CAROLINA RESIDENT, SOUGHT CUSTODY OF THE CHILD; NORTH CAROLINA, APPLYING THE ICPC, DID NOT APPROVE PLACEMENT WITH FATHER; THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S DENIAL OF FATHER’S CUSTODY PETITION ON THAT GROUND WAS REVERSED (CT APP).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Plea of “Nolo Contendere” to a Sex Offense in Florida Constitutes... Uncle Was Properly Found to Be a “Person Legally Responsible” for...