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Professional Reliability Exception to the Hearsay Rule (Re: Experts) Explained/Appropriate Date to Commence Prejudgment Interest in Breach of Contract Action Explained

The Fourth Department explained when an expert can rely on hearsay and when prejudgment interest should commence in a breach of contract action:

We reject defendant’s further contention that there was no evidentiary foundation for the testimony of plaintiffs’ damages expert, a construction cost estimator. It is well settled that” [o]pinion evidence must be based on facts in the record or personally known to the witness’ ” … . It is also well settled, however, that an expert is permitted to offer opinion testimony based on facts not in evidence where the material is ” of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion’ ” … . “The professional reliability exception to the hearsay rule enables an expert witness to provide opinion evidence based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, provided it is demonstrated to be the type of material commonly relied on in the profession’ ” … . Here, the expert’s damages testimony was based, in part, on measurements contained in a report that was not admitted in evidence, but those measurements were not otherwise disputed or challenged by defendant. Moreover, the expert testified that the information on which he relied was of the type relied on in his profession.

We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in awarding prejudgment interest from April 18, 1990. The jury did not specify a date on which plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of contract accrued and where, as here, “the precise date from which to fix interest is ambiguous, the date of commencement of the . . . action’ is an appropriate date to choose” … . We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the amount of prejudgment interest awarded from April 18, 1990 and providing that prejudgment interest is to commence from April 18, 1996, the date on which the action was commenced, to May 2, 2012, the date of the judgment. Caleb v Stevenson Envtl Servs Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 03057, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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