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Fall from Flatbed Truck Was Covered by Labor Law 240 (1)—Fall Caused by Gravity Acting On Plywood Being Hoisted from the Truck

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) claim.  Plaintiff fell from a flatbed truck while trying to steady plywood which became unsteady while being hoisted:

Although flatbed trucks “d[o] not present the kind of elevation-related risk that the statute contemplates” (Toefer v Long Is. R.R., 4 NY3d 399, 408), the accident in this case was caused by a falling object, which distinguishes this case from Toefer … . The accident that caused plaintiff’s injuries “flow[ed] directly from the application of the force of gravity to the object” … . In other words, the injuries were the result of “the direct consequence of a failure to provide statutorily required protection against a risk plainly arising from a workplace elevation differential” … . Inasmuch as plaintiff established that the plywood fell while being hoisted because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute, we conclude that he is entitled to summary judgment on the section 240 (1) claim … . Hyatt v Young, 2014 NY Slip Op 03056, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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