You are here: / / Pleading Requirements for Aiding and Abetting Fraud and Fraud Explained—Requirements...

Pleading Requirements for Aiding and Abetting Fraud and Fraud Explained—Requirements Not Met Here

In finding that the cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud should have been dismissed, the Second Department explained the pleading requirements:

To plead a cause of action to recover damages for aiding and abetting fraud, a complaint must allege the existence of an underlying fraud, knowledge of the fraud by the aider and abettor, and substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the fraud … . Here, the complaint failed to adequately allege the existence of an underlying fraud. A plaintiff asserting a cause of action alleging fraud must plead all of the following elements: (1) a material misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and which the defendant knew to be false, (2) made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely upon it, (3) the plaintiff’s justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation or material omission, and (4) injury … . In addition, in any action based upon fraud, “the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail” (… see CPLR 3016[b]). “[A]n essential element of any fraud [claim] is that there must be reasonable reliance, to a party’s detriment, upon the representations made” by the defendant against whom the fraud claimed has been asserted … . The plaintiff must show a belief in the truth of the representation and a change of position in reliance on that belief… .  Nabatkhorian v Nabatkhorian, 2015 NY Slip Op 03335, 2nd Dept 4-22-15

 

You might also like
THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT SUA SPONTE; ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS NOT SERVED, DEFENDANT’S APPEARANCE PRO SE WAIVED ANY LACK-OF-JURISDICTION ARGUMENT (SECOND DEPT).
HERE THE “SOPHISTICATED PARTIES” TO THE COMMERCIAL LEASE PROPERLY USED INSURANCE TO ALLOCATE THE RISK OF LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES; THEREFORE THE TENANT CAN BE LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE PROPERTY OWNER’S NEGLIGENCE IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).
DRIVER/OWNER OF THE MIDDLE VEHICLE IN THIS CHAIN-REACTION REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE IS NOT LIABLE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF BANK FAILED TO SHOW COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE MORTGAGE AGREEMENT AND RPAPL 1304; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPERATOR OF A SKATING RINK PROVIDED PROPER SUPERVISION AND THEREFORE WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE APPLIED, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE WAS PUSHED TO THE ICE BY AN UNRULY SKATER (SECOND DEPT).
NO REASON MOTHER’S ATTORNEY COULD NOT BE PRESENT, EITHER IN PERSON OR ELECTRONICALLY, DURING A HOME VISIT BY THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS) (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DENIED PETITIONER’S MOTION TO DISCONTINUE THE PROPERTY TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING WITH RESPECT TO ONE OF THE TAX PARCELS BECAUSE THE TOWN’S DEFENSE COULD BE PREJUDICED, HOWEVER SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE MERGER OF TWO TAX PARCELS BECAUSE NEITHER PARTY REQUESTED THAT RELIEF (SECOND DEPT).
THE COVID TOLL OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE RENDERED THE INDICTMENT TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Under Powers Reserved to the Town by an 1818 Law, the Town Cannot Regulate Shoreline... Under the Facts, Family Court Should Not Have Terminated Father’s Parental...