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In an Appeal from an Order Made Upon Appellant’s Default, Only Matters Contested Below Can Be Heard—Here the Only Matter Contested Below Was Appellants’ Request for an Adjournment to Obtain New Counsel—Relevant Review Criteria Explained

The Second Department noted that in an appeal from an order made upon the appellant’s default, the only issues which can be reviewed are those which were contested below.  Here only appellants’ request for an adjournment to obtain new counsel was contested, therefore that was the only issue the appellate court could consider.  The court determined the denial of the adjournment request was not an abuse of discretion.  “In deciding whether to grant an adjournment, the court must engage in a balanced consideration of numerous relevant factors, including the merit or lack of merit of the action, the extent of the delay, the number of adjournments granted, the lack of intent to deliberately default or abandon the action, and the length of the pendency of the proceeding … .” The court noted the appellants’ lack of cooperation with their second counsel and their consent to second counsel’s being relieved:

Where, as here, the order appealed from was made upon the appellants’ default, “review is limited to matters which were the subject of contest below” … . Accordingly, in this case, review is limited to the denial of the appellants’ request for an adjournment … .

The granting of an adjournment for any purpose rests within the sound discretion of the court … , and its determination will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of that discretion … . In deciding whether to grant an adjournment, the court must engage in a balanced consideration of numerous relevant factors, including the merit or lack of merit of the action, the extent of the delay, the number of adjournments granted, the lack of intent to deliberately default or abandon the action, and the length of the pendency of the proceeding … .

Applying these principles here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the appellants’ request for an adjournment to obtain new counsel after their second counsel was relieved, as second counsel requested that the appellants permit it to be relieved of the obligation of representation, based on the appellants’ lack of cooperation with second counsel, and the appellants thereupon voluntarily consented to second counsel’s request … . Hawes v Lewis, 2015 NY Slip Op 03127, 2nd Dept 4-15-15

 

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