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Failed Attempt to Circumvent the Banking Law by Making a High-Cost Home Loan to a Limited Liability Company to which the Home Had Been Transferred

The Second Department determined summary judgment should have been granted on defendants’ counterclaim alleging plaintiff’s violation of the Banking Law which prohibits “high-cost home loans” (Banking Law 6-1).  Plaintiff had attempted to circumvent the law by making the loan to a limited liabilIty company to which the defendants-owners had transferred the home. The Second Department determined the provisions of the Banking Law relating to “high-cost home loans” which (1) prohibited “subterfuge” to circumvent the law, (2) prohibited the consolidation of loan payments made payable in advance, (3) required certain notices, and (4) prohibited excessive points and fees, applied to the transaction in issue:

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on their first counterclaim, which was to recover damages and for declaratory relief for violations of Banking Law § 6-l, which imposes limitations and prohibits certain “practices for high-cost home loans” (Banking Law § 6-l[2]). The defendants established, prima facie, that the subject loan was a “high-cost home loan” (Banking Law § 6-l[1][d]; see Banking Law § 6-l[1][f][i]-[iii]; [g][ii]…). …[U]nder the circumstances of this case, Banking Law § 6-l applies to the … loan, even though it was made to a limited liability company, and not to “a natural person” (Banking Law § 6-l[1][e][ii]). The provisions of Banking Law § 6-l apply “to any person who in bad faith attempts to avoid the application of this section by any subterfuge” (Banking Law § 6-l[3]). Here, the defendants made a prima facie showing that a representative of [plaintiff] attempted, in bad faith, to avoid the application of the statute by “subterfuge,” and that, thus, the statute applied to the Aries loan (Banking Law § 6-l[3]). Moreover, the defendants’ submissions demonstrated, prima facie, that [plaintiff] violated the provisions of Banking Law § 6-l(2) by consolidating the first 12 payments and having them “paid in advance from the loan proceeds provided to the [defendants]” (Banking Law § 6-l[2][e]); engaging in “loan flipping” (Banking Law § 6-[2][i]); making the loan “without due regard to repayment ability” (Banking Law § 6-l[2][k]); failing to provide required notices (see Banking Law § 6-l[2][e]; [2-a][a]); and financing points and fees, as defined in Banking Law § 6-l(1)(f), “in an amount that exceeds three percent of the principal amount of the loan” (Banking Law § 6-l[2][m]).  Aries Fin., LLC v 12005 142nd St., LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 03115, 2nd Dept 4-15-15

 

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