Although the Agreements at Issue Set Up an Investment Fund (Targeting Brazil) in the Cayman Islands, the Fact that the Agreements Were Negotiated, Drafted and Executed in New York Conferred Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendant Fund

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, over a partial dissent, determined that the complaint should not have been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant investment fund.  Although the agreements in question set up the investment fund in the Cayman Islands, targeting investments in Brazil, the agreements were negotiated, drawn up and executed in New York.  Because the claims arose “from defendants’ transaction of business in New York, CPLR 302(a)(1) confer[red] personal jurisdiction over defendants.” The court explained that “[d]etermining whether long-arm jurisdiction exists under the “transacts business” provision of CPLR 302(a)(1) … is a two-pronged inquiry: “a court must decide (1) whether the defendant transacts any business in New York and, if so, (2) whether [the] cause of action aris[es] from such a business transaction” … . [In addition] [t]he assertion of personal jurisdiction must … be predicated on a defendant’s “minimal contacts” with New York to comport with due process … :”

Under New York’s long-arm jurisdiction statute, “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who . . . transacts any business within the state” (CPLR 302[a][1]). “By this single act statute . . . proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction . . . so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted” … . Determining whether long-arm jurisdiction exists under the “transacts business” provision of CPLR 302(a)(1), therefore, is a two-pronged inquiry: “a court must decide (1) whether the defendant transacts any business in New York and, if so, (2) whether [the] cause of action aris[es] from such a business transaction” … . “In effect, the arise-from’ prong limits the broader transaction-of-business’ prong to confer jurisdiction only over those claims in some way arguably connected to the transaction” … .

The assertion of personal jurisdiction must also be predicated on a defendant’s “minimal contacts” with New York to comport with due process … . This requires an examination of the “quality and the nature of the defendant’s activity” and a finding of “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York], thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws” … . * * *

… [P]laintiff alleges that Citibank’s lawyers drafted the documents in New York. … “[T]he nature and purpose of a solitary business meeting conducted for a single day in New York may supply the minimum contacts necessary to subject a nonresident participant to the jurisdiction of our courts” … . [The drafting of the agreements] was not a “purely ministerial” act of merely executing a contract in New York that had been negotiated elsewhere, which would likely be insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction … . * * *

Finding that New York courts have personal jurisdiction over defendants in this case also comports with due process. “So long as a party avails itself of the benefits of the forum, has sufficient minimum contacts with it, and should reasonably expect to defend its actions there, due process is not offended if that party is subjected to jurisdiction . . . …. . Such is the case before us. Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with New York by purposefully entering the state to negotiate and execute contracts … . Wilson v Dantas, 2015 NY Slip Op 03088, 1st Dept 4-14-15