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A Defendant Who Has Been Found Mentally Unfit to Proceed To Trial Cannot Be Subjected to a Parole Revocation Proceeding

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined that a defendant who has been deemed unfit to proceed to trial following a psychiatric examination cannot be subjected to a parole violation hearing.  The defendant, who was on lifetime parole for murder and had been committed to the custody of the Office of Mental Health (OMH), assaulted a fellow patient.  After a psychiatric examination, the defendant was deemed unfit to proceed to trial on charges stemming from the assault. Thereafter the Department of Corrections and Community Services (DOCCS) brought parole revocation proceedings against the defendant. The defendant was transferred to the custody of DOCCS and, after a hearing, his parole was revoked and he was incarcerated.  The Appellate Division (reversing Supreme Court) granted the defendant’s petition to annul the parole revocation, and returned the defendant to parole. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that subjecting the defendant to the parole revocation hearing, after defendant had been deemed mentally incompetent, violated defendant’s right to due process.  The Court of Appeals noted that its ruling may result in the release of persons found unfit for trial, something only the legislature can remedy:

It is, of course, well established — as a matter of common law and also of due process — that “a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial” … . The State contends that parole revocation proceedings do not raise the same concerns because parole revocation is not part of a criminal prosecution.

It is true that parole revocation deprives an individual only of “a restricted form of liberty” and thus implicates “some form of due process [but] not the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding” … . Just as due process requires us to safeguard the liberty of parolees, we must also recognize the state’s strong interest in effectively managing parolees without unduly burdensome procedural restraints … . However, in balancing these competing interests, we conclude that several of the reasons underlying the bar against prosecuting a mentally incompetent defendant apply also to parole revocation hearings. Clearly salient are constitutional concerns about the fundamental fairness of a proceeding in which a defendant who is unable to make decisions about his defense may be returned to prison. But foremost is the concern already mentioned, about the accuracy of the proceedings. An incompetent parolee is not in a position to exercise rights, such as the right to testify and the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses (see 9 NYCRR 8005.18 [b] [2], [4]), that are directly related to ensuring the accuracy of fact-finding. It is true, as the State emphasizes, that the parolee is guaranteed a right to representation by counsel at the revocation hearing. But representation is not enough. A parolee must be able to provide the factual underpinnings of the presentation.

We conclude, therefore, that holding a parole revocation hearing after a court has deemed the parolee to be mentally incompetent violates the due process provision in our State Constitution… . Matter of Lopez v Evans, 2015 NY Slip Op 02868, CtApp 4-7-15

 

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