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Whether Arresting Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion to Stop and Detain Is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact Which Cannot Be Reviewed by the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals, over a strong dissent, determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider whether the police had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and detention of the defendant, a mixed question of law and fact:

Whether the circumstances of a particular case rise to the level of reasonable suspicion presents a mixed question of law and fact … . Because the Appellate Division’s reversals were thus not “on the law alone or upon the law and such facts which, but for the determination of law, would not have led to reversal” (CPL 450.90 [2] [a]), these appeals are not authorized to be taken.

While acknowledging that “determinations as to reasonable suspicion typically present a mixed question of law and fact,” the dissent cites People v McRay (51 NY2d 594 [1980]) for the proposition that these cases instead involve a straight-up question of law — namely, “the minimum showing necessary to establish reasonable suspicion” … . In McRay, though, the Appellate Division reversed the suppression court on the ground that the People’s proof was insufficient as a matter of law to support probable cause to arrest (id. at 605). When we disagreed and reversed, we therefore remitted to the Appellate Division for factual review, emphasizing that an inference of probable cause was permitted, but not required, on the facts established (id. at 605, 606). Here, by contrast, the Appellate Division reversed the suppression court because, when exercising its independent fact-finding powers, it drew a different inference from the established facts, thus deciding a mixed question of law and fact. The dissenting Judge strongly disagrees with the Appellate Division. But the views of individual Judges of this Court on the merits of defendants’ suppression motions are beside the point because the Criminal Procedure Law simply does not vest us with jurisdiction to entertain these appeals… . People v Brown, 2015 NY Slip Op 02552, CtApp 3-26-15

 

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