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“Single Motion Rule” Barred Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly denied motions to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) based upon the “single motion” rule.  The defendants had made motions to dismiss certain causes of action in the original complaint.  Therefore the defendants could not make those motions again with respect to an amended complaint:

CPLR 3211(e) provides, in relevant part, that at any time before service of a responsive pleading is required, a party may move to dismiss a pleading “on one or more grounds set forth” in CPLR 3211(a), and that “no more than one such motion shall be permitted.” Accordingly, this “single motion rule prohibits parties from making successive motions to dismiss a pleading” pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) … . The rule bars both repetitive motions to dismiss a pleading pursuant CPLR 3211(a), as well as subsequent motions to dismiss that pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) that are based on alternative grounds … . Here, the defendants previously moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the original complaint on the grounds that documentary evidence established a complete defense to the action (see CPLR 3211[a][1]), that the action was time-barred (see CPLR 3211[a][5]), and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211[a][7]). * * * Accordingly, those branches of the defendants’ motion which were to dismiss … [substantially identical] causes of action in the amended complaint were procedurally barred by the single-motion rule, and were properly denied (see CPLR 3211[e]…). Bailey v Peerstate Equity Fund, L.P., 2015 NY Slip Op 01911, 2nd Dept 3-11-15

 

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